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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article concerns transactions in which one party must buy 
“protection” by paying another not to harm him by engaging in an action 
the payee would otherwise be free to do.  Private law often permits a party, 
in pursuing its own interests, to inflict incidental harm on another party 
without incurring any liability to compensate the loss.1  In such cases, the 
vulnerable party (the “victim”) may find that the cheapest way to reduce 
such harm is to pay the other party (the “menace”) a bribe to forbear from 
the harmful action.  Although such protection transactions are 
commonplace, it has long been recognized that some of them, such as non-
disclosure agreements, are usually lawful while others, such as secrets 
blackmail, are not.  But legal theory has struggled to rationalize the line it 
draws between benign bribes and criminal blackmail, between legally-
approved transactions in which property owners smoothly coordinate their 
privileged but harm-producing activities and legally-disapproved 
transactions in which extortionists wring unjust profit from their victims. 
This Article offers a theory of blackmail that distinguishes it from 
lawful bribery in a way that justifies its differential legal treatment.  Under 
this approach, the critical difference between blackmail and bribery 
depends on the amount of money the menace demands for protection.  
Bribery compensates the menace only for the cost it incurs in forbearing 
from harmful activity.  Blackmail exists to the extent that the amount 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law.  J.D. Yale Law School, 1974. 
 1.   The jurisprudential treatment of interests that receive no legal protection, under the 
description damnum absque injuria, was analyzed by Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate 
in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1041 (1982) (Legal 
liberty is the privilege to inflict damnum absque injuria.).  Singer concluded that the ability to freely 
harm another is implicit in any Hohfeldian privilege. Id. at 1050.  Earlier analyses of the phenomenon 
were given in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (1894) 
(arguing that whether a harmful act is legally privileged depends on many factors); Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197 (1890) (lamenting that mental 
and emotional suffering inflicted by a malicious but lawful act is damnum absque injuria). 
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demanded and paid for forbearance exceeds this cost.  The “extortion 
premium” that a victim must pay the blackmailer constitutes unjust 
enrichment because it is acquired by exploiting the victim’s fear of harm 
that the blackmailer threatens to inflict. 
Protection transactions were featured in the groundbreaking article 
that helped to inaugurate economic analysis of law, Ronald Coase’s The 
Problem of Social Cost.2  There, Coase addressed the economic problems 
created when productive enterprises create harms, such as pollution, 
whose costs are borne by others.  Economists had argued that allocative 
efficiency required that firms producing such externalities3 be legally 
required to bear their full cost.  Coase disagreed.  Some externalities are 
efficient and some are not.  Whether legal treatment of an externality leads 
to allocative inefficiency depends on the relative values of the productive 
activities of the producer and its victims.  To achieve efficient allocation 
of productive resources in the presence of externalities, Coase posited an 
idealized market, free from transaction costs,4 in which producers and their 
victims could take those values into account by exchanging legal 
entitlements to inflict harm or to be free from harm.  Their exchanges 
would minimize the social cost of productive activities without the need 
for government regulation of commercial externalities. 
However, Coase’s analysis overlooked one significant transaction cost 
that would prevent ideal markets in harm-related entitlements.  
Transactions in which menaces sell protection might be prohibited by the 
law of extortion.5  Moreover, the prospect of making a profit in protection 
markets may lead menaces to create protection rackets, in which harm-
causing enterprises find it more profitable to sell protection than to engage 
in the productive activity that generates the harm.  Although The Problem 
of Social Cost expressed no concern about this possibility, its publication 
launched an on-going debate about whether extortion is intrinsic to an 
efficient market in property rights.6 
                                                          
 2.   R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost] reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988) 
[hereinafter COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW].  
 3.   COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 23–27 (explaining why he 
rejected the term “externality”).  
 4.   Coase assumed that transaction costs associated with these bargains would be zero.  See 
Notes on The Problem of Social Cost in COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 
2, at 174–75 (noting that the term “transaction cost” was developed after publication of The Problem 
of Social Cost). 
 5.   This Article will use “blackmail” and “extortion” synonymously, with the understanding 
that it does not deal with those forms of extortion in which the threatened act is itself either criminal 
or tortious.  “Blackmail” is the more generally used term for this kind of transaction.  
 6.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost supra note 2, at 7–8 (discussing the risk that the rancher 
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Why should the law seek to prevent transactions that Coase’s analysis 
shows to be prima facie beneficial?  This Article offers a conception of 
blackmail that differentiates it from Coasean bribery and provides a 
theoretical basis for its legal inhibition.  Under this approach, a protection 
transaction is a benign Coasean bribe if the victim purchases the menace’s 
forbearance to engage in the harmful activity at a price that compensates 
the menace for whatever benefit it will lose by its forbearance.  The same 
protection transaction becomes blackmail if and to the extent that the 
menace demands more than that amount.  The extortion premium that the 
victim must pay represents unjust enrichment to the menace because it 
results from exploitation of the victim’s fear of harm.  Under this analysis, 
blackmail is thus a question of degree that varies with the size of the 
extortion premium demanded. 
Alas, this theory does not square with the existing law of blackmail.  
Whether courts will treat a protection transaction as blackmail or bribery 
turns not on the presence or absence of unjust enrichment but on whether 
the exchange was induced by a menace’s threat.7  Although the threat 
requirement gives the appearance of an easily-administered rule, it is often 
very difficult to apply and even in clear cases is both over- and under-
inclusive in targeting wrongful behavior.8  The presence or absence of a 
threat is an unsatisfactory test for blackmail because the wrong lies not in 
threat itself or in the nature of the threatened act but in the unjust 
enrichment the blackmailer obtains by misuse of its power to harm the 
victim. 
The persistent problem of Coasean blackmail illuminates a deep-
seated ambivalence in moral and legal theory about the propriety of 
                                                          
would threaten to increase herd size just to induce the farmer to pay more); Ronald Coase, The 1987 
McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655 (1988) [hereinafter “Coase, Blackmail]”) 
(discussing application of The Problem of Social Cost to secrets blackmail).  On the question of 
extortion, Coase’s article must be considered alongside the related analyses of Harold Demsetz, When 
Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 24 (1972) [hereinafter “Demsetz, When Does 
the Rule of Liability Matter?”]) and Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of 
Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 230–32 (1972) [hereinafter “Demsetz, Wealth Distribution”].  Later 
analyses of extortion in Coasean bargains include George Daly & J. Fred Gieetz, Externalities, 
Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 997 (1975); D. W. Bromley, Externalities, Extortion, 
and Efficiency: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 730 (1978); Ekkehard Schlicht, Exploiting the Coase 
Mechanism: The Extortion Problem, 49 KYKLOS 319 (1996); Wolfgang Buchholz & Christian 
Haslbeck, Strategic Manipulation of Property Rights in Coasean Bargaining, 153 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 630 (1997); Steven G. Medema, ‘A Magnificent Business Prospect . . .’ the 
Coase Theorem, the Extortion Problem and the Creation of Coase Theorem Worlds, 11 J. INST. ECON. 
353 (2015).  
 7.   See infra, Part V.  Sidney W. DeLong, Symposium, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the 
Second Paradox, 141 U. PENN. L. REV. 1663, 1685–86 (1993) [hereinafter “DeLong, Second 
Paradox”] (contrasting different legal treatment of identical exchanges initiated by menacers’ threats 
and by victims’ offers). 
 8.   Id. at 1677–79 (considering possible efficiency-based rationales for the threat requirement). 
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trafficking in harm.  In some contexts, profit from the exercise of 
monopoly leverage is accepted as a natural incident of property ownership 
and liberty.  In other contexts, similar profit resulting from similar leverage 
is condemned as extortion.  This Article seeks to refocus the normative 
debate away from the nature of the threat to the presence or absence of 
unjust enrichment and from concern about the harm to the victim to 
concern about the profit obtained by the wrongdoer. 
Part II of the following discussion interprets Ronald Coase’s The 
Problem of Social Cost as depicting an idealized protection market in 
which enterprises trade entitlements both to inflict and to be free from 
harms caused by their productive activities.  Coase reconceived these 
harm-related entitlements as valuable factors of production to be traded by 
the enterprises that exploited them.  Their reallocation increases their value 
and reduces social cost.  But Coase’s analysis of such markets had 
ominous implications. 
Part III describes the economic and legal conditions under which 
Coasean bargaining can occur.  Protection transactions reverse existing 
legal rights and privileges relating to harm-causing activities.  Whether 
two enterprises will engage in Coasean bargaining depends on the relative 
values of their productive activities and the costs they impose on each 
other.  A protection transaction is feasible whenever a privileged action 
will cause harm to a victim that is greater than the benefit it confers on the 
actor.  But Coasean bargains in the real world may be prevented by 
transaction costs.  One of those transaction costs is that the exchange may 
be prevented by the law of extortion. 
Part IV describes the circumstances under which a protection 
transaction becomes extortionate.  When a menace acquires leverage over 
a victim, it has a legal privilege to inflict harm that costs the victim more 
than the benefit of the harmful action to the menace.  This permits the 
menace to demand an extortion premium that exceeds the cost it would 
incur in forbearing from the threatened harm.  Indeed, a menace may find 
the sale of protection to be more profitable than the activity that causes the 
harm.  But this form of profit is not morally justifiable.  To the extent that 
it overcompensates the menace for its forbearance, the extortion premium 
constitutes unjust enrichment.  
Part V contrasts this analysis with the actual law of extortion.  The law 
condemns protection transactions initiated by a menace’s threat of harm 
while it approves identical exchanges initiated by a victim’s offer.  The 
threat requirement makes the law of extortion both under- and over-
inclusive under the proposed standard.  It condemns some menaces who 
sell protection at a price that only compensates them for their costs of 
forbearance while it exonerates other menaces who demand an extortion 
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premium for the same protection.  
Part VI compares the unjust enrichment theory with other theories of 
blackmail that are based on a transaction’s third-party economic or social 
effects.  Opinion is sharply divided on the economics of legalized 
protection markets, in part because of unanswerable empirical questions 
about the actual effects of laws permitting and prohibiting protection 
transactions.  Non-economic theories have been unable to solve the 
paradox of blackmail by reference to the rights of the victim without 
reference to the blackmailer’s enrichment.  
Part VII applies the unjust enrichment theory of protection 
transactions to four commonplace situations: commercial secrets 
blackmail, residential spite structure blackmail, reputational blackmail, 
and remedial blackmail. 
The Conclusion argues that the critical distinction between bribery and 
blackmail arises not from differences in the bargaining process that leads 
to a protection transaction but from the amount the victim must pay for 
that protection.  Regardless of how they come about, Coasean bargains are 
not problematic if menaces merely sell forbearance at or near their cost.  
They become extortionate only when, through the use of leverage, the 
menace extracts an extortion premium that exceeds that cost.  Unjust 
enrichment thus distinguishes protection markets from protection rackets. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST. 
One cannot exaggerate the jurisprudential significance of Ronald 
Coase’s article, The Problem of Social Cost.9  Although it ostensibly 
addressed only the economic problem of externalities,10 in the course of 
its analysis it laid much of the foundation of economic analysis of law by 
emphasizing the many ways in which the legal system determines how the 
economic system functions.11  The Problem of Social Cost caused an 
upheaval in the legal academy,12 where, in the course of setting out its 
                                                          
 9.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2.  As of the mid-1990’s, it had become the 
most cited article in legal periodicals.  R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost: The Citations, 71 
CHI. KENT L. REV. 809, 809–10 (1996). 
 10.   The term “externality” was coined by British economist Arthur C. Pigou in THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE (1920), whose analysis Coase rejected.  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 
2.  Coase used the term “harmful effects” in preference to “externality” in part to avoid the connotation 
that had not been taken into account by producers and so could be treated like any other factor of 
production.  COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 27. 
 11.   RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (“Coase’s article . . . 
opened a vast field of legal doctrine to fruitful economic analysis.”).  
 12.   Coase acknowledged that his analysis “has not in general commanded assent” among 
economists.  COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 1. 
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simplifying assumptions, it gave the first voice to many ideas that have 
since become firmly fixed analytic principles.13  A brief, non-technical 
article by a non-lawyer economist thus became one of the most influential 
pieces of legal scholarship of the last century.14  But The Problem of Social 
Cost also revealed dramatic differences between the economic and legal 
perspectives on the common law.  One of the most telling was in the matter 
of the law and economics of harm. 
A. Coasean Bargains. 
The Problem of Social Cost is in large part a standard economist’s 
parable about how the pricing system can achieve an efficient allocation 
of scarce resources and maximize the social product.15  Its novelty was 
that, rather than describing a market for goods and services, it depicted a 
market in legal entitlements either to inflict or to be free from the harms 
that can be caused by productive activities.  It was the first study to identify 
a producer’s legal privilege to act without incurring liability for damages 
as a valuable factor of production,16 a property interest that can reduce the 
cost of production for one party even as it increases the costs of production 
to another. 
Coase applied his approach to the problem of externalities created by 
productive enterprises.  Economists are concerned about what happens 
when a producer’s commercial activity imposes incidental, 
uncompensated costs on other producers.  For example, a factory might 
generate pollution that imposes costs on other factories, or a railway might 
                                                          
 13.   In The Problem of Social Cost can be found the following ideas and concepts, all novel for 
their time: Law is a constraint that imposes costs on, and creates incentives for, economic activity; a 
legal system may be evaluated by its economic effects on social productivity; Parties trade bundles of 
legal rights in markets; parties will, if not prevented by transaction costs, negotiate around inefficient 
legal rules, including those that establish their default legal entitlements; the market will allocate legal 
entitlements, like other forms of property, to the persons who value them the most; harmful 
interactions are jointly caused by both the actor and the sufferer; incompatible uses of real property 
should be adjusted so as to maximize the social product; and bargains that efficiently reallocate harm-
related entitlements may be prevented by transaction costs.  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra 
note 2.  
 14.   Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).  Ironically, one of the unintended effects of The Problem of Social 
Cost was to inspire an article that contributed to the founding of the major academic competitor to 
Law and Economics, the Law and Society Movement.  Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: 
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) [hereinafter 
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle] (empirical study showing how farmers and ranchers rely on 
community norms to deal with cattle trespass and that Coasean bargaining is virtually non-existent). 
 15.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 1. 
 16.   Id. at 6–7. 
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start trackside fires that harm nearby farming operations.17  If producers 
are not required to pay the costs of this harm, then the private benefits 
accruing to their owners might not equal their total (or “social”) costs, 
leading to a misallocation of scarce resources committed to the productive 
activities.  At the time of The Problem of Social Cost, the dominant 
economic theory of Arthur Pigou held that, if the state did not compel 
producers to compensate such harms by property or tort rules, then it 
should regulate or tax producers of externalities by forcing them to 
“internalize” the cost of the externalities they created in their productive 
activities.18 
The Problem of Social Cost is an argument that such governmental 
regulation is unjustified.  Depending on the values of the goods and 
resources involved in the conflicting uses, to force the producer to pay for 
its damage may not lead to an efficient result19 and might lead to inefficient 
over-investment in less valuable, vulnerable activities.  In theory, under 
ideal20 market conditions, the parties would always negotiate to an 
efficient solution regardless of whether the state gave protection against 
the harms of productive activity.  If ex ante harm-related property 
entitlements led to inefficient over- or under-production, then rational 
producers and those who were affected by their production would 
coordinate their activities by mutual agreement.  When necessary, parties 
who suffered from the effects of externalities whose harms exceeded their 
benefits would bribe producers not to cause them, so that producers would 
                                                          
 17.   COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 23–27 (discussing 
prevailing views of externalities and the need for government intervention).  Businesses have inflicted 
an extensive range of harms on neighboring landowners: smoke, vile smells, noise, invasive animals, 
flooding, fire, crowds of people, criminal activity, noxious weeds, unsightly eyesores, and other forms 
of nuisance.  Transactions in the modern world create their own forms of uncompensated negative 
externalities: ride-hailing services create traffic congestion, cell phones create hazards of distracted 
driving, and social media merchants contribute to widespread disinformation.  
 18.   COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 23–27 (summarizing 
prevailing views of externalities and the need for government intervention); Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, supra note 2, at 28.  Whether his criticism of Pigou was apt has been seriously questioned.  
A. W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 65 (1996) (criticizing Coase 
for mischaracterizing Pigou’s positions); see also Herbert Hovencamp, Perspectives on the New 
Regulatory Era: The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 633 (2009) 
(noting that Pigou rather than Coase first described what later became known as transaction costs). 
 19.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 17–19; COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 26 (“The ubiquitous nature of ‘externalities’ suggests to me that there 
is a prima facie case against intervention . . . .”). 
 20.   Coase based his arguments on the assumption that there would be no transaction costs to the 
exchanges he envisioned.  He later said that the most valuable contribution of The Problem of Social 
Cost was not the Coase Theorem but his identification of transaction costs as important determinants 
of efficient markets and, by extension, legal policy.  COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, 
supra note 2, at 13. 
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engage in only those harm-causing activities whose value exceeded their 
total costs.21 
Coase illustrated his argument with an extended example drawn from 
the law of cattle trespass.22  Coase’s hypothetical rancher raised unfenced 
cattle near a neighboring farmer who raised crops.  The cattle damaged23 
some of the farmer’s crops, leading to the question of which party should 
bear this loss.  Local law allocates this loss either by making the rancher 
liable to the farmer for the loss (the “fencing in” rule) or by the farmer 
having no claim for cattle damage (the “fencing out” rule).24  Using 
assumed arithmetic values of the marginal destructive effect of adding 
individual cattle to the rancher’s herd,25 Coase showed that ranchers whose 
unfenced cattle damaged the crops of neighboring farmers would always 
enter into agreements with the farmers so as either to permit or prohibit 
the cattle from damaging the crop, depending on the relative economic 
values of cattle and crops.26  By trading entitlements, the rancher and 
farmer could achieve an efficient solution to their conflict regardless of 
which fencing rule prevailed in their jurisdiction. 
Unless transaction costs prevented these bargains, incompatible land 
uses would be coordinated by contractual exchanges rather than by 
property and tort law.  The invisible hand of the marketplace would 
                                                          
 21.   One might question the degree to which Coase’s analysis refuted the Pigovian consensus in 
favor of regulating or taxing externalities.  Coase acknowledged that transaction costs prevented actual 
reallocative bargaining that would force enterprises to internalize their social cost.  See Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15–17 (instancing the collective action problems of 
negotiating agreements about pollution with large numbers of parties).  His chief argument against 
Pigou’s approach of using governmental regulation in such cases was that the government too faced 
transaction costs, including a lack of information about the costs and benefits of conflicting economic 
activity that would be necessary to an efficient allocation of entitlements.  To force enterprises such 
as railways to bear all the physical costs inflicted by their activity might lead to unintended 
consequences, such as inefficient over-investments by those vulnerable to the harm.  Id.  In the end, 
however, he was forced to acknowledge that transaction costs prevented an ideal solution to the 
problem of externalities.  Id. at 43. 
 22.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 2–8.  
 23.   Id.  Coase did not describe the nature of the harm the cattle caused.  Obviously, if they 
consumed a significant part of the crop, the farmer’s claim might sound in conversion or unjust 
enrichment rather than trespass.   
 24.   Coase was aware that American law favored the rancher in states with a “fencing out” rule 
and favored the farmer in states with a “fencing in” rule.  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra 
note 2, at 36 n.49.  Pigou would presumably have favored giving the rights to the farmer in order to 
force the ranchers to internalize the total cost of their cattle. 
 25.   In explaining Coase’s chilly reception by economists, Oliver Williamson criticized him for 
using “ponderous arithmetic examples” instead of the mathematical or geometrical expressions with 
which economists are more familiar.  Oliver E. Williamson, Book Review, The Firm, The Market, and 
the Law by R.H. Coase, 77 CAL. L. REV. 223, 229 (1989).  Coase’s examples are accessible to lawyers 
who do not speak the language of economics. 
 26.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 2–8. 
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efficiently allocate harm-related entitlements27 and the cowman and the 
farmer would be friends. 
B. Implications. 
The Problem of Social Cost is often cited for the Coase Theorem: 
Absent transaction costs, ex ante legal entitlements are irrelevant to 
efficient resource allocation because parties will always bargain to an 
efficient solution.28  In fact, his point was quite the opposite: ex ante legal 
entitlements do matter because transaction costs often prevent reallocative 
bargaining.  Parties usually end up with the rights and privileges that the 
law gives them at the outset, which may well be inefficient in light of the 
relative values of the resources and products of their enterprises.  Yet, 
Coase had little faith that courts or legislators could assign ownership 
rights in a way that would duplicate the ideal choices the parties would 
have made in the absence of transaction costs, for both theoretical and 
practical reasons.29  Because the values of resources and products are 
constantly changing, it is impossible even in theory to assign harm-related 
rights, e.g., to cattle and corn, that would always induce efficient behavior 
by ranchers and farmers.  This year beef may be more valuable than corn.  
Next year corn may be more valuable than beef.  Coase was also skeptical 
that government had the information to make the correct assignment of 
rights even if it had the political will to do so.  Government faces its own 
transaction costs that prevent more efficient land use regulation.30 
This Article concerns some of the unstated implications of Coase’s 
analysis.  In positing a market in which victims paid menaces to forbear 
from harmful activity, Coase incidentally revealed that a privilege, e.g., to 
pollute a stream or graze a cow without legal liability for the resultant 
harm, not only has a use value for the polluter, as a factor of production, 
but also an exchange value.  This exchange value rests on what is 
commonly called “nuisance value,” or the amount of harm the act will 
inflict on others.  If a legal privilege’s nuisance value exceeds its use value, 
as Demsetz pointed out, a rational producer will maximize its profit by 
fully exploiting that nuisance value in an exchange with the victim.31  And 
                                                          
 27.   COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 12 (“If rights to perform 
certain actions can be bought and sold, they will tend to be acquired by those for whom they are most 
valuable either for production or enjoyment.  In this process, rights will be acquired, subdivided, and 
combined, so as to allow those actions to be carried out which bring about that outcome which has the 
greatest value on the market.”). 
 28.   Id. at 13–15. 
 29.   Id. at 26.  
 30.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 18. 
 31.   Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 24. 
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rational producers will invest in legally-privileged, harm-causing 
enterprises in order to maximize their income from protection exchanges. 
When nuisance value exceeds use value, protection rackets may arise 
in which ranchers sell freedom-from-cows to farmers for more than they 
would receive selling beef to consumers; factories sell freedom-from-
pollution to residents for more than they would receive by selling 
pollution-generating products to consumers; and blackmailers sell non-
disclosure agreements to wrongdoers for more than they would receive by 
selling scandal to the media.  The natural result of a thriving protection 
racket is a shift in investment from production of goods to the production 
of (otherwise pointless) harm (by potential blackmailers) and an increase 
in investments in (otherwise unnecessary) protection against the enhanced 
threats (by potential victims of blackmail). 
Another unstated implication of The Problem of Social Cost is that its 
argument applies to relations between any two parties, not just productive 
enterprises.  Coase confined his main analysis to harmful interactions 
between productive enterprises, in which the costs and benefits of their 
respective activities could easily be compared to determine the most 
efficient use of land.  Business-to-business examples also validated 
Coase’s argument that harmful interactions were reciprocal and that one 
of the parties would suffer “harm” under any legal regime, either by 
suffering from the interaction or by being prohibited from engaging in the 
harmful productive activity.32  Moreover, the harm resulting from the 
mutual interference of neighboring enterprises was easy to see as the joint 
product of their interaction and propinquity and not, as is usual in analysis 
of tort and nuisance law, the responsibility of one of them, the “tortfeasor,” 
in injuring the other, passive victim.  Thus, all of the harms instanced in 
his examples were incidental to some productive activity and none were 
the product of malice. 
But some of the examples in The Problem of Social Cost could also 
be applied to non-producers or consumers.  For example, Coase later 
acknowledged that the analysis was equally applicable to such non-
commercial interactions as secrets blackmail.33  In these cases, the 
disutility of the harm cannot be easily quantified and the victim’s passive 
contribution to the interaction is notional at best.  Moreover, the legally-
privileged, harm-causing act itself may not be incident to any productive 
activity of the menace but may be engaged in solely to harm the victim. 
Coase implied in his analysis of blackmail34 that the state should 
                                                          
 32.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing reciprocity). 
 33.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 656–58. 
 34.   Id. 
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allocate rights to the victim of secrets blackmail in order to obviate the 
need for costly protection transactions.  But because the secrets 
blackmailer’s threatened disclosure is legally privileged, the victim has no 
right to prevent it unless she can engage in a protection transaction and 
that transaction is often blocked by the law of extortion. 
III. THE CONDITIONS FOR COASEAN BARGAINS. 
A. Vulnerability to Harm. 
Coasean bargaining in harm-related entitlements will take place only 
when a menace has the ability to act in a way that will cause harm to a 
victim without incurring a legal obligation to compensate the victim.  
“Harm” in this Article will refer to any unwanted experience that a party 
would be willing to pay to avoid or would refuse to suffer unless in return 
for payment.  Harm includes anything that a victim perceives as damaging 
to his person or property, his reputation, his feelings, or his financial 
interests. 
Under such conditions, the subject matter of a harm-related bargain 
consists of two antagonistic legal relationships: rights to be free from the 
threatened harm (correlated with duties not to inflict it) and privileges to 
inflict the threatened harm (correlated with the absence of rights to be free 
from it.)  The menace and victim are always in a legal relation under which 
the menace either owes a duty to the victim not to harm the victim, or 
under which the menace is legally privileged to harm him.35 
Parties may adjust this harm-related relationship in exactly two ways, 
which for convenience will be referred to as “permission transactions” and 
“protection transactions.”  Permission transactions occur when the parties 
contract out of a rule making the menace legally responsible to the victim 
for the harm it causes.  In a permission transaction, the menace obtains the 
victim’s permission to engage in the harmful activity, as, for example, by 
purchasing a license, easement, waiver, or release from the victim.  In the 
circumstances described in The Problem of Social Cost, a permission 
transaction occurred when a rancher in a fencing-in state paid a 
neighboring farmer to release it from liability for negligently-caused harm.  
The agreement gave the rancher permission to engage in cattle trespass in 
return for a payment that compensated the farmer for the harm to its 
                                                          
 35.   In Hohfeldian terms, a permission transaction converts a prohibition into a privilege to 
engage in the prohibited act, while a protection transaction extinguishes a privilege to engage in a 
harmful act and replaces it with a prohibition or duty not to so act.  See Singer, supra note 1, at 1049–
50. 
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property.36 
By contrast, protection transactions arise when the parties contract out 
of a default rule that exonerates the menace from legal responsibility for 
the harm.  In a protection transaction, the victim pays the menace not to 
engage in harmful activity, as, for example, by purchasing a restrictive 
covenant.  A protection transaction occurred when the Coasean farmer in 
a fencing-out state paid the rancher not to graze cattle that would harm the 
crop.  The rancher sold protection against the harm to compensate it for its 
cost of forbearance to raise cattle.  The Problem of Social Cost featured 
both permission and protection transactions.  The problem of extortion 
arises only in protection transactions. 
B. Leverage. 
The economic incentives underlying any protection transaction 
depend on the expected cost of the threatened harm to the victim and the 
expected cost of forgoing the harmful activity to the menace.  Coase 
repeatedly emphasized that a permission or protection transaction will 
occur only when it is the most cost-effective way for the parties to deal 
with a harmful event.37  A party facing harm from another party’s 
productive activity will suffer the cost of the harm only if it has no less 
costly alternative.  Several adaptive strategies may be available to a victim 
facing potential harm.  It may remove itself or its property from exposure 
to the harm or otherwise render itself less vulnerable.  It may deter the 
harm by making a counter-threat.  Or it may seek the cooperation of the 
menace by its agreement to forbear from the harm.  The least costly 
alternative to suffering the threatened harm is the true cost of an externality 
to that victim.38 
Thus, for example, suppose a factory intermittently spews smoke into 
the air above a neighboring beer garden.  The smoke irritates the beer 
garden’s customers and has led to reduced patronage and loss of revenue.  
The beer garden’s lawyer has advised that the factory is legally free to emit 
the smoke under local land use law and the local law of nuisance.  The 
                                                          
 36.   The farmer may have chosen either to have suffered the ensuing crop loss without 
compensation or to have engaged in different productive activities, such as growing the crop elsewhere 
or growing a less-vulnerable crop. 
 37.   See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 3 (referring to the farmer’s 
alternatives as including fencing as well as “the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile 
radio and other means . . . .”); see also Coase, Notes on The Problem of Social Cost in COASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, 175–76 (describing multiple measures either party 
might take). 
 38.   See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? supra note 6, at 23–24 (referring to 
the “next best use” to which the victim can put the land absent the menace’s agreement). 
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factory owner has ignored requests by the owner of the beer garden to 
reduce smoke emissions during business hours. 
The beer garden might respond to this situation in several ways.  It 
might simply absorb the loss of revenue, which represents the prima facie 
cost of the harm.  But it will explore other possibly less costly ways to 
mitigate the harm.  It might install fans to blow the smoke away.  It might 
enclose and air-condition the drinking area.  It might eliminate the beer 
garden and serve only indoor restaurant customers.  Each measure has its 
own net expense to the beer garden in comparison to the prima facie cost 
of the harm. 
Other responses might approach the problem more aggressively.  The 
beer garden might resort to a counter-threat in an attempt to increase the 
factory’s cost of polluting to the point at which polluting was no longer 
profitable.39  The beer garden might ask political allies to bring regulatory 
pressure to bear on the factory, or organize a boycott of the factory or its 
affiliates by the beer garden customers, or start a social media campaign 
against the factory. 
At some point the beer garden may consider a Coasean bribe, offering 
to pay the factory to reduce or eliminate the smoke problem.  The cost of 
this alternative will be the amount the factory demands plus the transaction 
cost of the agreement. 
It would be rational for the beer garden to choose from among these 
alternatives the one that produced the lowest total cost in expense and 
revenue loss.  The cost it suffers by taking the best alternative is the true 
cost of the externality to the beer garden and represents the most that it 
would offer as a bribe to the factory for its forbearance in any protection 
transaction.  This unavoidable expense is also the measure of the 
“leverage” that the factory has in any such transaction with the beer 
garden. 
If a victim’s actual vulnerability to harm arises only after and because 
of a change in circumstances, it becomes meaningful to speak of the 
protection transaction as taking place either before or after that change.  A 
menace will have no leverage in an ex ante transaction and will have 
maximum leverage in an ex post transaction.  Absent leverage, the 
payment in an ex ante protection transaction is a bribe and will always be 
less than the payment in an ex post protection exchange.  The payment in 
                                                          
 39.   Coase’s analysis did not consider the counter-threat strategy.  For example, the farmer might 
sow plants poisonous to cattle near his crops or simply steal the marauding cattle.  Robert Ellickson 
reports that ranchers in Shasta County who repeatedly permitted their cattle to trespass in their 
neighbors’ fields sometimes lost cattle in this way to neighbors who would kill marauding cattle.  
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 14, at 679.  
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an ex post transaction may or may not be blackmail, however, depending 
on whether leverage is exploited to achieve an extortion premium. 
Thus, for example: 
(1) Assume that Rancher and Farmer negotiate a covenant protecting 
Farmer’s crop before Farmer has leased land adjacent to the ranch.40  In 
this ex ante transaction, if Rancher rejects Farmer’s offer of payment, 
Farmer may elect to lease other land adjacent to other Ranchers.41  Neither 
party has leverage over the other.  Rancher should accept any offer greater 
than the cost she incurs by providing protection by reducing or relocating 
her herd.  If other ranchers are competing for the Farmer’s business in 
other locations, the protection will be sold at a competitive price. 
(2) Assume instead that Rancher and Farmer negotiate a protection 
agreement after Farmer has leased land near the ranch and planted the 
crop.  Rancher, who is now a monopolist because of Farmer’s sunk costs, 
can insist on any price that is smaller than the amount of unavoidable harm 
Rancher’s cattle can inflict.  So long as she bears no liability for crop 
damage, under these conditions, it is in Rancher’s interest to increase the 
amount of harm her cattle will inflict. 
Coase’s examples from hypotheticals and nuisance cases in The 
Problem of Social Cost were all ex post transactions.42  The parties were 
owners or lessors of land that made them vulnerable to unavoidable harm 
from their neighbors.  Coase and Demsetz described this economic 
relationship as a “bilateral monopoly” because neither owner could deal 
with any other party to purchase or sell protection from their harmful 
activities.43  Each of them acknowledged that excessive payments for 
protection could not be demanded in the presence of competition, e.g., if 
multiple ranchers were offering terms to a farmer before his decision about 
where to raise the crop.44 
                                                          
 40.   Unlike the situation prevailing in areas with open range land, it is presumed, as it was in The 
Problem of Social Cost, that only one rancher threatens any farmer. 
 41.   Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 23. 
 42.   See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2.  In addition to the conflicts between 
neighboring landowners engaged in ranching and farming.  Id. at 2–8.  Coase discussed disputes 
involving spark-emitting railroads and adjacent land owners.  Id. at 29–34; a noisy confectionary 
business and a neighboring residence used as a doctor’s office.  Id. at 8–10; a chemical factory emitting 
fumes that caused damage to the products of a nearby fiber manufacturer.  Id. at 10–11; a business that 
piled up timber so as to block air flow from the chimney of an adjacent residence.  Id. at 11–13; a 
brewer producing smelly emissions that harmed a neighboring residence.  Id. at 14; and a smelly fish 
and chips restaurant harming neighboring residents.  Id. at 21.  
 43.   Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 23. 
 44.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 658 (In the case of bluff threats, since the refraining from 
the activity is costless to the menace, the amount the victim would have to pay in a competitive market 
“tend[s] towards zero.”); see Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 23–
24 (stating that competition among protection racketeers would cause the cost of protection to drop to 
the cost of private security services).  
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C. Cost of Forbearance 
Assume the beer garden proposes a bribe to the factory.  How much 
will a menace demand to forbear from the harm-causing activity?  The 
value of the privilege to emit smoke as a factor of production to the factory 
is equal to the cost of the factory’s least expensive alternative to doing so.  
Just as the beer garden has several alternatives to the harmful interaction, 
so does the factory.  It might without incurring any cost be able to emit the 
smoke at times when the beer garden was unoccupied.  It might employ a 
technological solution such as an air purification system or different mode 
of venting the smoke.  It might employ a different, perhaps costlier, 
smoke-free processing method.  At the extreme, it might convert the 
factory into a beer garden or an artist’s collective, with a modest drop in 
revenue.  The actual value of the smoke emission privilege to the factory 
is the lowest loss of net revenue it would experience when pursuing the 
least costly of these alternatives.  That figure represents the factory’s true 
cost of forbearance and represents the lowest amount it would accept 
voluntarily to forgo smoke pollution.  But of course, the factory is not 
required to sell smoke abatement at this price if it can obtain more from 
the beer garden. 
The factory’s lowest cost alternative to producing smoke would also 
determine the amount of leverage the beer garden would have against the 
factory if the shoe were on the other foot and the beer garden had the power 
to enjoin the smoke emission.  The lowest cost alternative now represents 
the least harm the factory will suffer if it must cease emitting smoke.  It 
thus represents the most that the factory would pay to release the 
injunction in a permission transaction with the beer garden to obtain smoke 
emitting privileges.  This amount also represents the use-value value of 
the harm-producing activity to the factory.45 
The alternatives available to both parties not only dictate which 
unilateral actions they might take when facing the prospect of harmful 
interaction; they also provide the basis on which the parties will negotiate 
protection or permission agreements with each other.  These negotiations 
will often be costly, however, because each party lacks information about 
the other’s true costs, which may lead to inefficient failures to agree.46  The 
victim will pay a bribe to the menace equal to the cost of the menace’s 
lowest cost alternative to the harmful activity, but only if the victim has 
                                                          
 45.   See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 44 (noting that privileges to engage 
in harm producing activity are valuable factors of production). 
 46.   Coase, Notes on The Problem of Social Cost in COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW, supra note 2, at 178 (Transaction costs might prevent exchange of information necessary to 
efficient Coasean bargains.). 
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information about this cost.  The alternatives that each party might 
reasonably consider are idiosyncratic and generally unknown to the other 
party.  They may turn on subjective valuation and individualized 
technological capacities. 
D. Transaction Costs 
Coase considered the most important contribution of The Problem of 
Social Cost not to be the Coase Theorem but his identification of what 
later became known as “transaction costs.”47  These are all of the costs 
parties must incur to effect an exchange, which Coase appeared to define 
so broadly as to include anything that prevented an exchange from 
occurring.  Among Coase’s greatest contributions to economic theory was 
his recognition that economic institutions, such as the firm, were designed 
to economize on transaction costs.48 
As a simplifying assumption, Coase assumed that the menace and a 
victim could bargain costlessly to a permission or protection transaction 
to show that such bargaining would efficiently allocate harm-related 
entitlements without the need for regulation.  Although Coasean 
bargaining works perfectly only in the imaginary world of zero transaction 
costs, it also operates even in the presence of significant transaction costs 
so long as the parties perceive their bargaining gains to exceed those 
costs.49  All of the reallocative deals arising from the nuisance and trespass 
cases discussed in The Problem of Social Cost were apparently feasible in 
real life.50  Transaction costs assume significance only when the 
externalities are widespread, as in the pollution cases, making multi-party 
                                                          
 47.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15 (referring to the need for a transactor 
to “discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on 
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the 
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on”); COASE, 
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 6 (adopting Dahlman’s later description of 
transaction costs as “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 9–10, 13–15. 
 48.   OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 34 (1985) (Coase’s 
insight nevertheless required later identification of factors relevant to transaction cost differences.). 
 49.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15–16 (“[A] rearrangement of rights 
will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the 
rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.”). 
 50.   Or maybe not.  The fact that none of the deals were actually struck in the cited cases may 
imply that transaction costs must have prevented them, especially if transaction costs are defined as 
whatever-prevents-a-potential-bargain.  See COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW, supra 
note 2, at 25 (arguing against the case for prima facie government regulation of externalities, if parties 
have not reallocated inefficient externalities by agreement, the explanation “must be” that they were 
prevented from doing so by transaction costs.  If government has also failed to act, it must be for the 
same reason.).  
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agreements by large numbers of indeterminate victims impossible. 
Coase knew that the perfect bargaining world of zero transaction costs 
did not exist and that in the real world, reallocative bargains would often 
be prevented.51  The parties’ harm-related legal entitlements do matter in 
such a world because the parties often cannot contract around them.52  
Lawmakers53 and courts54 should make such reallocative bargaining less 
costly where it is possible to do and, where it is not, should assign risks to 
coincide with their best guess about how the parties would have agreed to 
allocate them.55 
But Coase was deeply skeptical about the ability of lawmakers to enact 
property rules that would resolve the externality problem because they 
lacked the information necessary to do so.56  For one thing, a fixed set of 
entitlements that would be economically efficient under all conditions is 
impossible even in theory because of fluctuation in the market prices of 
goods and resources and changes in technology and culture that render 
productive activities obsolescent.57  In opposition to the Pigovian strategy 
of regulating or taxing productive externalities, Coase demonstrated that 
private bargaining was the only reliable way to achieve allocative 
efficiency in cases of incompatible land uses.  No ex ante legal 
arrangement could possibly achieve the right allocation by legislative or 
judicial fiat.  The mix of uses that maximizes the net social product of 
conflicting enterprises in any particular case of incompatible productive 
use is determined by the contingent market values of both their products 
and the costs of the inputs they use as well as the constantly changing costs 
of alternative arrangements open to both parties.58 
Coase’s analysis of transaction costs may actually have given support 
to Pigou’s advocacy of a general rule that makes menaces liable for all 
harm caused to victims: It is usually easier to contract out of such a rule 
than it is to contract out of a contrary rule giving menaces a privilege to 
inflict such harm without liability.  The transaction costs of permission 
                                                          
 51.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15–16.  
 52.   Coase, Notes on the Problems of Social Cost in COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW, supra note 2, at 178 (“[W]ith positive transaction costs, the law plays a crucial role in 
determining how resources are used.”). 
 53.   Id. at 17–18. 
 54.   Id. at 19.  
 55.   See Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1097 n.18 (1972) (referring to the 
“best briber” standard). 
 56.   COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 19. 
 57.   Id. at 18. 
 58.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 40. 
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transactions are generally lower than those relating to protection 
transactions because they are easier to negotiate.  A menace need only 
obtain permission for the exact harm it intends to generate and need not 
pay for more than it plans to inflict.  A victim purchasing protection, 
however, must anticipate and buy off all potential harms that the menace 
may be able to inflict, e.g., by changing its activity after the bribe is paid.59  
For the law to give rights to victims instead of privileges to menaces also 
prevents protection rackets from arising, as argued in the next section. 
IV. THE CONDITIONS FOR COASEAN BLACKMAIL. 
A. Leverage 
Because the leverage represents the most that the victim will pay to 
avoid the threatened harm, no potential for extortion arises if the menace’s 
cost of forbearance is equal to or greater than this amount.  No protection 
transaction will take place under these conditions.  The potential for 
extortion arises only when the victim faces harm that exceeds the menace’s 
cost of forbearing from the harmful activity. 
However, the cost of forbearance may be zero or even negative, if the 
harm does not result from an activity that is profitable for the menace to 
engage in.  In such a case, any payment would compensate the menace for 
its forbearance. 
B. The Extortion Premium 
The concepts of leverage and the cost of forbearance permit an 
economic definition of blackmail.  Blackmail exists only when and to the 
extent that the menace uses its harm-causing leverage to obtain more than 
its cost of forbearance from the harm.  The excess of the payment over the 
cost of forbearance is an extortion premium.  Because the amount of this 
premium varies from case to case, blackmail is a question of degree. 
The concept of an extortion premium is not novel.  Coase argued that 
blackmail existed to the extent that the menace demanded more than the 
cost of forbearance from the threat.60  Demsetz referred to the possibility 
that monopoly rents would exceed a competitive price of protection in an 
                                                          
 59.   The menace is the “best briber,” the party who can least expensively bribe the other party, 
as described by Calabresi & Melamad, supra note 55, at 1097 n.18. 
 60.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 658 (opining that the blackmail demand is the portion of 
the payment that exceeds the value of the foregone activity to the blackmailer.). 
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extortion transaction.61  Several commentators analyzing secrets blackmail 
have argued that “market price” blackmail should not be illegal, where the 
blackmailer demands only the opportunity cost of his secrecy.62 
The concept of an extortion premium is also consistent with the “claim 
of right” defense to a criminal charge of extortion.63  A victim’s threat to 
disclose a tortfeasor’s wrongful act is not “wrongful” within the meaning 
of extortion law if it is made solely to compel the tortfeasor to pay 
compensation or return property to which the threatener believes in good 
faith that she has a lawful claim.  It is not blackmail to say, “If you don’t 
compensate me for my injury, I’m going to the police and the public and 
tell everyone exactly how you injured me” if the statement is made in good 
faith.64  However, the defense is not available if the demand is for 
materially more than a good faith claim for compensation.65  Thus, for 
example, if a judge driving under the influence of alcohol on the way home 
from a party rams into my car doing $1,000 damage and refuses to pay for 
repairs, it would not be extortion for me to threaten to disclose the event 
to the police or the public unless the judge pays for the damage.  It would 
be extortion for me to demand $100,000 for my secrecy.66  The cost of my 
forbearance is $1,000.  The extra $99,000 in the second example is a 
measure of the harm the judge will suffer, not the value of the disclosure 
to the threatener.67 
                                                          
 61.   See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 23. 
 62.   CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 102 (2d ed. 1981) (Law should permit a journalist 
who sells a harmful story to its target to recover his opportunity costs in not selling to the media.); 
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 164–65 (1980) (opining that a 
potential secrets blackmailer who would otherwise sell the story to the media should be allowed to 
offer a right of first refusal to the victim); Joseph Scalise, Jr., Comment, Blackmail, Legality, and 
Liberalism, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1503 (2000) (opining that market price blackmail excites “no moral 
outrage”).   
 63.   See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“It is an affirmative defense to 
prosecution based on paragraphs (2), (3) or (4) that the property obtained by threat of accusation, 
exposure, lawsuit or other invocation of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or 
indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to which such accusation, exposure, lawsuit or 
other official action relates, or as compensation for property or lawful services.”). 
 64.   See United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 70–71 (2d Cir.), rehearing at 196 F.3d 383 (1999) 
(recognizing claim-of-right defense to extortion but requiring nexus between threatened disclosure 
and source of claim). 
 65.   See United States v. Jackson, 196 F.3d 383, 388–89 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that where the 
defendant had no good faith claim to amount sought and no good faith belief in a claim of right, threat 
to disclose out of wedlock child of famous actor was extortion and failure to instruct jury on claim of 
right defense was harmless error.). 
 66.   The claim of right defense also requires a nexus between the harm and the disclosure.  It is 
extortionate to threaten the judge with disclosure of the auto accident unless she pays me money that 
I believe she owes me for political campaign advertising services.  Jackson, 180 F.3d at 70–71. 
 67.   The amount demanded has occasionally been thought relevant to the presence or absence of 
extortion.  Coase quoted Lord Roche in Thorne v Motor Trade Ass’n, 1937 App. Cas. 797, 818, to the 
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Thus, an extortion premium may be demanded for refraining from an 
act that is profitable to the actor if the amount demanded exceeds that 
profit.  Yet, under existing law, a threat is not considered to be extortionate 
unless the threatened activity is one that will not benefit the threatener.68  
Most analyses of blackmail stipulate that the threatened activity is one that 
is engaged in solely to harm the victim.  But when the threatener makes a 
profit from its ability to harm the victim, the foregone benefit is irrelevant 
to the wrongfulness of the demand. 
V.  THE LAW OF EXTORTION. 
A. The Threat Requirement 
Both the criminal law of extortion and blackmail69 and the contract 
doctrine of duress70 require a threat as an element of the offense or tort.  A 
threat communicates the menace’s willingness to engage in the harmful 
act unless it is paid to refrain from it.  If truthful, this information reduces 
the transaction costs of a protection exchange by giving the victim 
information about the menace’s conditional intentions.  A warning or an 
offer can communicate the same information and can have the same value 
in reducing the transaction costs of the exchange. 
Ex post protection agreements, like other contracts, are often formed 
by offer and acceptance.  When a victim offers money for a menace’s 
forbearance, the exchange resembles any other purchase of valuable 
property and the menace who accepts this offer is blameless.  But a menace 
who “offers” protection to a victim on the same terms may have made a 
“threat,” with dramatically different legal consequences.  Consider the 
                                                          
effect that the “demand of a sum extortionate in amount would . . . clearly be evidence . . . in a civil 
case of an intent to injure as opposed to an intent to protect trade interests and in a criminal case of the 
fact that the sum was demanded without reasonable or probable cause . . . .” Coase, Blackmail, supra 
note 6, at 668. 
 68.   MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(3), (7) (“A person commits theft [by extortion] if he 
purposefully obtains property of another by threatening to . . . (3) [expose harmful secrets]; or . . . (7) 
inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor.”). 
 69.   Id. (“A person commits theft [by extortion] if he purposefully obtains property of another 
by threatening to . . . (3) [expose harmful secrets] or . . . (7) inflict any other harm that would not 
benefit the actor.”); 18 U.S.C. § 873 (2012) (punishing anyone who receives payment “under a threat 
of informing” against any violation of federal law); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012) (Extortion consists 
of “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.”).  
 70.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. 1981) [hereinafter 
“RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS] § 175(1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by 
an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is 
voidable by the victim.”); Id. at § 176(1) (stating when a threat is improper). 
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following pairs of examples: 
1A: Upon leaving his job, an employee threatens that he will expose a 
secret harmful to his employer unless he is paid a sum of money.  The 
employee thereby commits blackmail.71 
1B: An employer offers severance pay to a departing employee 
conditioned on his agreement not to expose its harmful secrets.72  The 
resulting agreement is not unlawful and in accepting payment on these 
terms, the employee does not commit blackmail. 
2A: An employer threatens to terminate an at-will employee unless 
she releases a tort claim against it.  If she agrees, the employee may later 
avoid the release under the doctrine of duress.73 
2B: An at-will employee, without being threatened, offers to release a 
tort claim against her employer in return for a promise of continued 
employment.  If the employer accepts the offer, the employee is bound by 
the release.74 
3A: During discovery a plaintiff in a products liability lawsuit obtains 
evidence of the defendant’s potential liability to other claimants.  Plaintiff 
threatens to publicize the evidence unless defendant agrees to an excessive 
settlement.  Plaintiff may be guilty of extortion and the agreement is 
voidable because of duress.75 
                                                          
 71.   State v. McInnes, 153 So.2d 854, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that employee’s 
threat to expose employer’s tax fraud constituted extortion).  See also Berger v. Berger, 466 So.2d 
1149, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that husband’s threat to expose wife to IRS for tax 
fraud constituted duress permitting her to avoid settlement agreement).  This example, and the next 
three were cited in DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1685–86. 
 72.   Such agreements have long been common.  Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract 
Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998) (considering limits on enforceability); 
Julia Preston, Laid-Off Americans, Required to Zip Lips on the Way Out, Grow Bolder, N.Y. TIMES, 
(June 11, 2016),https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/us/laid-off-americans-required-to-zip-lips-on-
way-out-grow-bolder.html [https://perma.cc/3DJJ-2T9M]. 
 73.   Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); United States 
v. Smith, 228 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D. La. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 176, cmt. 
E, illus. 11.  See also Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(threatening to fire at-will employees to force employees to sell their shares of employer stock might 
constitute duress); Perkins Oil Co. v. Fitzgerald, 121 S.W.2d 877, 885 (1938) (employee’s release 
voidable where obtained by employer’s threat to terminate his stepfather).  Cf. Simko, Inc. v. Graymar 
Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1108 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (non-compete agreement signed by employee 
under threat of firing held enforceable against competing business; no duress found); Price v. Carmack 
Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. 1985) (retaliatory discharge for filing claim under employer’s 
group health policy not tortious). 
 74.   See Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625 F. Supp. 998, 1013 (D. Del. 1985) (enforcing 
at-will employee’s release of claim for bonus given in return for promise of continued employment).  
Such a transaction may, for example, represent the terms of the settlement of a tort claim, agreeable 
to and desired by both parties.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74(2), cmt. e (abandonment 
of claim known to be invalid is consideration if bargained for and made in signed writing). 
 75.   See State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 700 (Vt. 1970) (holding threat to use secret 
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3B: During discovery a plaintiff in a products liability lawsuit obtains 
evidence of defendant’s potential liability to many similar claims.  
Worried about its potential liability to other claimants, the defendant offers 
to pay plaintiff an excessive settlement conditioned upon plaintiff’s 
agreement not to disclose the evidence.  Plaintiff is not guilty of extortion 
and the agreement is enforceable.76 
4A: A landowner threatens her neighbor that, if he does not pay her, 
she will erect a structure on her property that will block the neighbor’s 
valuable view.  If he promises to pay her, his promise will be 
unenforceable if her threat is deemed to be wrongful under the doctrine of 
duress.77 
4B: A landowner, wanting to assure the valuable view from his 
property, offers to purchase an easement from his neighbor that prohibits 
her from erecting structures that would block his view.78  If she agrees, his 
promise to pay for the easement is enforceable. 
5A: A vendee seeking to be released from a land contract threatens the 
vendor that it will resell the land to a known polluter unless the vendor 
releases it from the contract.  The vendees’ threat constitutes duress and 
the release is unenforceable.79 
5B: A vendor/developer requires vendees of houses in the 
                                                          
information to obtain favorable settlement in divorce action constituted extortion). 
 76.   On the public policy implications of non-disclosure agreements see Ryan M. Philp, 
Comment, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-Disclosure Agreements, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 845 (2003).  
 77.   Entrepreneur Mark Zuckerberg reportedly purchased a neighbor’s lot for twice its value in 
response to a threat to construct a house near the property line that would have a direct view into 
Zuckerberg’s bedroom.  The neighbor allegedly “offered” to sell the lot at an inflated price before 
construction to preserve Zuckerberg’s privacy.  Zuckerberg then reportedly purchased three other 
surrounding properties, apparently to forestall future threats.  Sophie J. Evans, Mark Zuckerberg’s 
Fight for Bedroom Privacy: Inside Facebook Billionaire’s Battle with Backdoor Neighbor Who Sold 
Him His California Property ‘At a Discount Rate in Exchange for Entrée into Silicon Valley’s Elite’, 
U.K. DAILY MAIL (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2947711/Mark-
Zuckerberg-s-fight-bedroom-privacy-Inside-Facebook-billionaire-s-battle-backdoor-neighbor-sold-
California-property-discount-rate-exchange-entree-Silicon-Valley-elite.html [https://perma.cc/9ZRY 
-9P5K].  Such threats would constitute wrongful threats under the contract doctrine of duress.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. e, illus. 10 (for purposes of duress, a threat to use 
property in such a way would be “wrongful”).  See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, THE STATE, AND UTOPIA 
84–85 (1974) (A neighbor’s purchase of abstention from one who otherwise plans to erect a 
“monstrosity” is a productive exchange but not if the neighbor threatens to erect it just to extort a 
payment); A. H. Campbell, The Anomalies of Blackmail, 15 L. Q. REV. 382, 388 (1939) (similarly).  
The example assumes that the neighbor’s threatened action was legally privileged, so that the 
landowner could not enjoin the structure as a nuisance or under the rules relating to “spite” structures. 
 78.   See NOZICK, supra note 77, at 84. 
 79.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. e, illus. 10. Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 154 
A.2d 625, 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (Vendee under real estate contract threatened to resell 
to “undesirable” purchasers relieved seller from duty to return down payment). 
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development to agree to mutual restrictive covenants not to resell to known 
polluters.  In accepting the contracts on these terms, the vendees have not 
exercised duress and the agreements are enforceable. 
6A: A purchasing agent threatens a sales agent that if he does not pay 
her, she will prevent her company from purchasing his company’s 
products.  If he pays her, then he may not be guilty of bribery and she may 
have committed extortion.80 
6B: On the belief that otherwise he cannot make a sale, a sales agent 
pays a purchasing agent to induce her to buy his company’s products.  Not 
having been threatened, the sales agent has probably committed 
commercial bribery and the purchasing agent’s principal may recover the 
bribe from the sales agent in a claim for restitution.81 
These protection exchanges raise problems in the areas of criminal, 
contract, tort, and property law.  In each case, one of the parties is a menace 
as defined in this Article, who has a legal privilege to take some action 
that would inflict harm on the other party, the victim, without incurring 
liability to the victim for the harm.  Each exchange is substantively 
identical, extinguishing the menace’s harmful privilege in return for a 
payment by the victim, who pays to avoid the threatened harm.  In each 
pair of examples, the first, legally-disfavored exchange was initiated by a 
threat made by the menace and the second, legally-favored exchange was 
initiated by an offer made by the victim.  Each pair of protection 
agreements exemplifies a single rule: A protection exchange induced by a 
menace’s threat is illegal while the same exchange induced by an 
unthreatened victim’s offer is enforceable.  This paradox, already 
identified in the law of secrets blackmail,82 applies to the entire range of 
demands for money in return for forbearing to exercise a harmful privilege 
in a Coasean exchange.  The judicial use of the threat requirement to 
discriminate between blackmail and benign Coasean bargaining is 
ubiquitous.83 
                                                          
 80.   Kraft Gen. Foods v. Cattell, 18 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding it would be 
a defense to a civil claim of commercial bribery if plaintiff’s purchasing agent threatened seller with 
ruinous refusal to deal after he had become dependent on her business).  
 81.   Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 580 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding buyer 
had claim of restitution against seller’s agent who bribed buyer’s agent to purchase goods from seller’s 
principal, unless buyer ratified the bribe). 
 82.   DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1663.  See Kathryn H. Christopher, Toward a 
Resolution of Blackmail’s Second Paradox, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 (2005) (criticizing later 
theories of blackmail that attempt to resolve the second paradox and arguing that the paradox should 
not be resolved by criminalizing the menace’s acceptance of a bribe). 
 83.   See James Lindgren, Symposium, Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion 
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1702–03 (1993) [hereinafter Lindgren, Bribery-Extortion 
Distinction] (studying the sometimes narrow distinction between bribery and extortion by public 
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B. The Mixed Effects of the Threat Requirement. 
The ease of application of the threat requirement is illusory once one 
departs from unproblematic cases.  Although a threat requires 
interpretation to distinguish it from similar expressions that convey 
warnings or other information, threats are notoriously difficult to interpret.  
What appears to a court to be a threat by a menace may be, and be 
accurately understood by the parties to be, only a warning and an offer.  
What appears to a court to be an offer of a bribe by a victim who has not 
been expressly threatened may be, and be accurately understood by the 
parties to be, submission to an implied threat by a menace, motivated by 
fear of harm.84 
The use of leverage to extract an extortion premium does not always 
require a threat.  A protection exchange may be initiated by an 
unthreatened victim who learns of a risk posed by a potential menace and 
who approaches the menace seeking an agreement to forbear from the 
harmful action.  The menace, appreciating the situation, may refuse to 
agree unless the victim pays a substantial amount of the cost of harm the 
menace may inflict if it acts.85 
The threat requirement in the law of extortion has mixed incentive 
effects on protection transactions, making its net economic costs and 
benefits uncertain.86  Inhibiting a menace’s threats will also inhibit its good 
faith warnings and offers to forgo a harmful action at a reasonable price.  
The law of extortion thus prevents the utility gains that would result from 
menace-initiated protection transactions. 
But some efficiency gains may result from the law’s prevention of 
threats.  Without the ability to induce a protection transaction by means of 
a threat, potential extortionists would have less incentive to develop 
protection rackets.  The expected profitability of engaging in harm-
producing activity is reduced if the menace cannot actively induce the 
protection transaction and must await the offer of an unthreatened victim.  
Thus, while the threat requirement may inhibit some efficiency-producing 
protection transactions, it may make up for that loss in utility by preventing 
                                                          
officials and also noting the initiator of transaction irrelevant to bribery or extortion).  James Lindgren 
disagrees that transactions initiated by the victim are not blackmail.  See James Lindgren, Blackmail: 
On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36 UCLA L. REV. 597, 603 (1988) [hereinafter Lindgren, On 
Waste] (analyzing as blackmail an employee’s acceptance of another employee’s bribe to keep a guilty 
secret).  His analysis of the Hobbs Act led him to conclude that the bribery/blackmail distinction was 
spurious.  Id. 
 84.   Lindgren, Bribery-Extortion Distinction, supra note 83, at 1716–17. 
 85.   Christopher, supra note 82, at 1149 (blackmailer’s counter-offer). 
 86.   Some of these points appeared in DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1677–78. 
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protection rackets.  The problem is, as usual, that the empirical evidence 
to resolve this question is lacking. 
Inhibiting threats might also inhibit bluffs in which a menace threatens 
to engage in a harmful act without the intention of doing so.87  Bluffs and 
the possibilities of bluffs raise transaction costs of both victims and 
menaces, as they strive to verify threats and unmask bluffs.  Because bluffs 
arise only when menaces make threats, and not when victims make offers, 
the costs of bluffing will tend to be lower when threats are inhibited by 
extortion law.  This is especially true when a menace must make a 
significant investment in making a bluff threat credible. 
From a non-economic, normative perspective, the threat requirement 
may be an essential element of extortion because we are unwilling to 
punish a party who merely refuses to assent to a protection transaction for 
any payment that is less than the extortion premium.  A hold-out who does 
not initiate the negotiation over a protection transaction by making a threat 
is not an extortionist despite demanding an extortion premium.  So long as 
the victim makes the first offer and the menace merely refuses to sell 
before the victim names her price, she usually escapes both legal and moral 
censure.88  Deep-seated norms of property ownership give every owner an 
unreviewable right and privilege to refuse to sell.  Harm-related 
entitlements are property or liberty interests and under current law it is not 
extortion for their owners to refuse to extinguish them except in return for 
a price they choose to set. 
VI.  A THEORY OF BLACKMAIL AS UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
A.  Unjust Enrichment 
The normative theory of blackmail advanced by this Article is that the 
wrongfulness of a menace’s extraction of an extortion premium arises 
because it is obtained by threats of harm and is measured by the harm the 
menace can cause the victim.  To profit from a wrongful threat of harm is 
itself wrongful and makes the recipient liable to an action for restitution.89  
                                                          
 87.   Id. at 1678. 
 88.   But see Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (2017) (proposing a forced sale and taxing solution to gouging by holdout 
owners).  Posner and Weyl note the inefficiencies caused by the natural monopoly created by real 
property ownership, and conclude, surprisingly, that “allocative efficiency and . . . efficient market 
economy [are] impossible in the presence of property ownership.” 
 89.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (2)(a), (c) (“A threat is improper if the 
resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and (a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would 
not significantly benefit the party making the threat . . . or (c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of 
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The law typically strips wrongdoers of unjust enrichment to remove the 
incentive from actions deemed to be socially harmful.  The claim is limited 
to restitution of the extortion premium and does not extend to the entire 
payment made to the menace, because only the excess over the menace’s 
true cost of forbearance is wrongfully obtained. 
Restitution to prevent unjust enrichment rests on a normative basis that 
is different from that which supports compensation for injury resulting 
from breach of a duty.  Traditionally, a party is entitled to restitution to 
prevent the defendant from profiting by his own wrongful act at the 
plaintiff’s expense.90  The measure of the remedy is the amount of benefit 
the defendant has enjoyed rather than the harm to the plaintiff.  In some 
cases, plaintiff has suffered no provable harm by the defendant’s wrongful 
action,91 yet, it is not just that the defendant retains the profit from the 
wrong.  The wrongfulness of the blackmailer’s receipt of the extortion 
premium does not lie in the illegality of the action the blackmailer 
threatens, which is assumed to be non-criminal and non-tortious.  Nor is it 
merely the extraction of a monopolist’s profit as a natural incident of 
property ownership.  Nor does it arise merely from the making of a threat 
to do something harmful that one has a privilege to do.  The wrongfulness 
is the deliberate obtaining of the portion of the payment attributable solely 
to the harm the blackmailer can inflict on the payer.  Society has made the 
judgment that the blackmailer is entitled to be compensated for the cost of 
his forbearance, but he is not entitled to profit from the pain he can cause 
the victim. 
The unjust enrichment analysis also addresses one of the puzzles of 
blackmail.  How can blackmail harm the victim if the victim would prefer 
to make the blackmail payment rather than suffer a harm that he has no 
legal right to prevent?  If the victim is not harmed, then why does the law 
prevent the transaction?  The answer is that prevention of harm to the 
victim is not the norm that the law of blackmail should address. The 
prevention of unjust enrichment rests on a different footing from 
                                                          
power for illegitimate ends.”).  Id. at § 376 (restitution of benefit conferred pursuant to a contract 
voidable because of duress); RESTATEMENT (THIRD): RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (transfer induced by duress, defined as coercion that is wrongful as a matter of 
law subject to restitution to avoid unjust enrichment). 
 90.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD): RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 (No person is 
permitted to profit by his own wrong). 
 91.   Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (holding former CIA operative was 
unjustly enriched by royalties from book he published without having secured pre-publication 
approval required by his contract without need to show harm to government interests); Edwards v. 
Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (Ky. 1936) (ordering restitution for profits made from 
subterranean trespass of which plaintiff was unaware).  
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prevention of harm to the victim because it focuses on preventing the 
blackmailer from profiting from wrongful exploitation of his privilege to 
harm the victim. 
B. Coase and Demsetz on Blackmail. 
Coase and Demsetz initially answered critics who accused Coasean 
bargainers of extortion by insisting that extortion is a legal, not an 
economic concept.92  What the law might label “extortion” in Coasean 
bargaining was, on closer analysis, simply the extraction of monopoly 
rents by the menace.  The farmer and rancher were in a bilateral, locational 
monopoly because they owned93 adjacent land: neither could deal with a 
third party on the matter of the cattle-caused crop damage.  So long as the 
menace threatens to do only what it is otherwise lawful for it to do, the 
price it demands for forbearance is no more problematic than the price 
demanded by any other monopolist.  In any event, the blackmail payment 
does not affect the efficient allocation of resources despite shifting wealth 
between the parties.94  However, the existence of transaction costs means 
that the blackmail transaction can lead to wasted resources.95 
A protection transaction becomes economic extortion for Demsetz 
only when the threatened harmful activity has no social value, as when 
extortionists threaten to destroy property, or the threat is a bluff.  Even in 
these cases, however, Demsetz strongly cautioned against regulating 
protection transactions as extortionate if the activity being suppressed was 
an activity that normally had productive value to the menace because of 
the risk of erroneous determination that the activity would not have had 
productive value in any particular case.96 
In an article written after The Problem of Social Cost,97 Coase 
acknowledged that he had discounted the problem of extortion in harm-
                                                          
 92.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 656–58 (1988); Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability 
Matter?, supra note 6, at 24 (cautioning economists that extortion and blackmail are “legal and not 
economic distinctions”).  See also Demsetz, Wealth Distribution, supra note 6, at 230–32 (observing 
that “[m]any activities that seem outwardly identical to those that we identify as extortionate are 
perfectly legal”). 
 93.   It is unclear whether the rancher owned the ranch land or merely had grazing rights there 
nor is it clear whether the farmer owned or merely leased the cropland.  In all cases, the bargain was 
ex post because neither party could avoid dealing with the other for the current growing season. 
 94.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 8.  
 95.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 671 (When transaction costs are positive “[i]t is obviously 
undesirable that resources should be devoted to bargaining which produces a situation no better than 
it was previously.”).  
 96.   Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, supra note 6, at 25. 
 97.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 673–74. 
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related bargaining between productive enterprises for two reasons.  First, 
“extortionate” protection exchanges which result from strategic bluffs in 
bilateral monopolies have no impact on efficient reallocation in a world of 
zero transaction costs.98  Second, the potential for “extortionate” 
protection or permission transactions will exist regardless of which party 
is assigned the harm-related entitlement. 99  In regard to secrets blackmail, 
Coase thought that the blackmail transaction was economically wasteful, 
but that its mere wastefulness was not a sufficient justification for its 
illegality.100 
C. Other Theories of Blackmail 
Legal commentators have been less sanguine than Coase and Demsetz 
about the potential for blackmail in Coasean protection transactions.  
Concerned about both its legal and economic effects, they have sought to 
identify and distinguish extortionate transactions from the benign bribes 
described in The Problem of Social Cost.  These analysts, most of whom 
focused on secrets blackmail rather than nuisance, have divided into two 
camps.  Those in the larger camp argue in favor of the existing legal 
prohibition of blackmail, focusing their criticisms on reasons to outlaw 
strategic threats of harm that are made solely to exact blackmail 
payments.101  But these analysts have been forced to accept the legality of 
the far more common exploitation that can result from situations in which 
                                                          
 98.   Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 162–63; Coase, Blackmail, 
supra note 6, at 671 (In the absence of transaction costs, “the payment of blackmail leaves the 
allocation of resources unaffected and the value of production is maximized.”). 
 99.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 656–57 (noting that actions undertaken solely for the 
purpose of being paid not to engage in them the potential exploitation of legal entitlements would exist 
regardless of how the law allocated them). 
 100.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 673–74. 
 101.   Richard Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 555–57 (1983) [hereinafter 
Epstein, Blackmail, Inc.] (arguing that legalizing blackmail would foster wrongful behavior like fraud 
and violence); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 670 
(1984) [hereinafter Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox] (arguing that blackmail is unlawful because 
the blackmailer exploits the rights of third parties to sanction the victim); Richard Posner, Symposium, 
Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1820 (1993) (arguing from 
an economic perspective that blackmail should be unlawful because it is a coercive wealth-reducing 
transfer that has a sterile redistributive effect); Douglas Ginsberg & Paul Schectman, Blackmail: An 
Economic Analysis of the Law (1993) (arguing that blackmail diverts resources solely for wealth 
redistribution purposes); DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1689–91 (arguing that blackmail 
is made unlawful because of its social meaning rather than its economic effects).  Some theorists have 
broadened their analyses of coercion beyond secrets blackmail.  LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS, 133–
97 (1996) [hereinafter Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains] (extensive discussion of the paradoxes of blackmail and 
other forms of misbehavior from a deontological perspective); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2011) (focusing on nuisance cases, in which parties threaten to create 
costly, otherwise unprofitable nuisances in order to extract extortionate payments).  
2018 COASEAN BLACKMAIL 309 
the menace profits from its harmful activity but sells its forbearance at a 
much higher price.  They also must contend with transactions that are 
initiated and avidly sought by the victims. 
A smaller group of analysts have grasped the nettle and argued that 
the blackmail should be legalized, so long as what is threatened is not 
tortious or criminal.102  Because blackmail transactions benefit both the 
menace and the victim, they are utility-maximizing and for that reason 
should be legal and enforceable.103  If the law will not protect the victim 
from the menace’s harmful activity, the victim should be able to purchase 
protection from the menace at a price the victim is willing to pay and the 
menace is willing to accept.  These theories are economically rational but 
are compelled to dismiss the widespread public disapprobation of 
extortion as misguided or naive.  They must also accept the dead weight 
economic loss that protection rackets create by incentivizing people to 
allocate scarce resources to otherwise pointless harm-causing and harm-
preventing activities. 
Most blackmail and extortion theories are designed to address what 
has been called the paradox of secrets blackmail: why is it illegal to obtain 
money by threatening to do what you have a legal right to do?104  The 
paradox is admittedly perplexing.  Without incurring liability, the secrets 
blackmailer may or may not disclose the secret; she may or may not 
threaten to disclose it; she may or may not agree not to disclose it; she may 
or may not accept a bribe not to disclose it.  The only thing that she may 
not do is to demand money for not disclosing it.  How can the blackmail 
exchange be wrongful if all of its elements are separately legal and if both 
parties prefer it to the menace’s disclosure of the secret?  Most theories of 
blackmail agree that it should be illegal and struggle to rationalize its 
paradox.105 
                                                          
 102.   See discussion infra note 108. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   For a survey of theories that address this issue, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION, 90–103 
(1987) (concluding tentatively that the wrongfulness lies in the blackmailer’s proposal rather than the 
action proposed in the threat).  See also NOZICK, supra note 77, at 84–86 (Blackmail is wrong not 
because it harms the victim but because it leads to a pointless, yet costly transfer of money.). 
 105.   Most anti-blackmail analyses are concerned with secrets blackmail and have little 
application to other forms of extortion.  Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., supra note 101, at 553 (arguing that 
legalizing blackmail would foster wrongful behavior like fraud and violence); Lindgren, Unraveling 
the Paradox, supra note 101, at 670 (arguing that blackmail is unlawful because the blackmailer 
exploits the rights of third parties to sanction the victim); Scott Altman, Symposium, A Patchwork 
Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1639 (1993) (arguing that no single theory explains 
outlawing blackmail, making the rule inherently over- and under-inclusive); DeLong, Second 
Paradox, supra note 7, at 1689–91 (arguing that secrets blackmail is made unlawful because of its 
social meaning rather than its economic effects).  See generally, Leo Katz & James Lindgren, 
Symposium, Blackmail: Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1565–89 (1993).  Some 
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Law and economics scholars justify the prohibition of blackmail as a 
way of saving the economic waste that would result from widespread 
secrets blackmail transactions.106  As one expressed it, the secrets 
blackmail transaction is a pointless waste of resources spent in digging up 
dirt just to agree to bury it again.107  However, such arguments have 
become anachronistic in an age when both commercial and private actors 
are increasingly concerned with the protection of information from 
discovery and misuse.  Given the much greater interests at stake in these 
efforts, it strains credulity to believe that the marginal costs of espionage 
and counter-espionage would increase if blackmail were legalized. 
Economic arguments about the efficiency of blackmail laws are 
inconclusive even on their own terms.  The Problem of Social Cost showed 
that protection transactions can produce exchange surplus, which would 
be lost if protection transactions are prevented by laws against blackmail.  
Outlawing blackmail is economically justifiable only if the unknowable 
economic waste saved by its prohibition exceeds the unknowable lost 
surplus from protection transactions that blackmail laws prevent.108  Coase 
repeatedly complained about the use of “blackboard economics” that was 
uninformed about actual institutions that it purported to describe.109  The 
blackboard economics of secrets blackmail analysis is completely 
uninformed by empirical fact. 
Finally, economic arguments relating to blackmail all miss what is 
invisible to economics, the sense that the blackmailer has wrongfully 
harmed the victim.110  Arguments based on economic waste are an 
insufficient normative reason to treat blackmail as a felony.111 
Recognizing the value of Coasean protection transactions to both the 
menace and the victim, several theorists have argued that the law should 
be changed and blackmail should be legalized so long as what is threatened 
                                                          
theorists have broadened their analyses of coercion beyond secrets blackmail.  Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains, 
supra note 101, at 133–97 (explaining paradoxes of blackmail and similar forms of misbehavior from 
a deontological perspective); Kelly, supra note 101, at 1645 (focusing on nuisance cases, such as the 
“livery stable” scam, in which parties threaten to create costly, otherwise unprofitable nuisances in 
order to extract extortionate payments). 
 106.   Ginsberg & Schectman, supra note 101 (arguing that, where the blackmailer stands to gain 
nothing by the threat, legalizing blackmail would lead to wasteful investments by potential menaces 
and potential victims); Posner, supra note 101 (arguing that legalizing blackmail would lead to 
inefficient over-enforcement of the criminal laws against the crimes of which the blackmailer threatens 
to accuse the victim). 
 107.   Ginsberg & Schectman, supra note 101.  
 108.   DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1677–79. 
 109.   Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, supra note 2, at 28–31. 
 110.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 675 (referring to blackmail as “moral murder”). 
 111.   DeLong, Second Paradox, supra note 7, at 1689. 
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is not itself tortious or criminal.112  Walter Block has long espoused an 
iconoclastic, libertarian view that informational and other forms of 
blackmail transactions should be legal.113  Block finds that the legal 
prohibition of secrets blackmail is irrational, justified neither by economic 
nor moral reasoning.  An information blackmailer threatens to do nothing 
that is wrongful or illegal, unlike an extortionist who threatens a victim 
with physical harm or property damage.  The victim of a secrets 
blackmailer has no legal entitlement to confidentiality and is willing if not 
eager to pay the blackmailer’s price to prevent disclosure, which would 
cause the victim much greater harm or loss.  The ostensible beneficiaries 
of the law against blackmail are the victims, who are in fact harmed by 
legal prohibition of what may be the only way they can avoid the risk of 
disclosure. 
The most recent defense of Coasean bargaining (although they do not 
use this term) has been made by Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, who 
apply Block’s victim-centered analysis not to secrets blackmail but to 
commercial coercion and the contract doctrine of duress.114  Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar define “credible coercion” as a demand based on a threatened 
harmful act that the menace is likely to carry out because the act will 
benefit the menace.115  A non-credible threat, or a bluff, is a threatened act 
that a menace is not likely to carry out because the act would be costly to 
the menace.  Victims ought to be free to pay menaces to forgo credible 
threats because the exchange will make both parties better off than if the 
threat were carried out.  These exchanges will be prevented if the parties 
                                                          
 112.   See Walter Block & Robert W. Gorden, Blackmail, Extortion, and Free Speech: A Reply to 
Posner, Epstein, Nozick, and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 37 (1985) (criticizing theories that 
blackmail should be illegal); Russell Hardin, Symposium, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1787, 1794 (1993) (offering a limited endorsement of certain types of blackmail, such as plea 
bargains, from an institutional perspective and arguing that outlawing blackmail penalized some 
victims, threatened with exposure in the press); F.E. Guerra-Pujol, The Problem of Blackmail: A 
Critique of Coase, and the Case for Blackmail Markets, 5 CRIT. 1 (2012) (arguing for the creation of 
markets in secrets and discounting moral intuitions that blackmail is wrongful); Wolfgang Buchholz 
and Christian Haslbeck, Strategic Manipulation of Property Rights in Coasean Bargaining, 153 J. 
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 630 (1997); Medema, supra note 6.  Making a broader argument that 
extortionate transactions should usually be legally enforced are Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 
Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2005) [hereinafter Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible 
Coercion]; and Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible 
Threats, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (2004) [hereinafter Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress]. 
 113.   Block has written over twenty articles in this vein.  Most are cited in Walter Block & Robert 
W. McGee, Blackmail from A to Z: A Reply to Joseph Isehbergh’s “Blackmail from A to C”, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 569, 570–71 n. 2 (1999); Block & Gorden, supra note 112, at 37.  Block disagreed 
with Coase’s arguments in favor of outlawing blackmail.  See also Hardin, supra note 112, at 1787 
(condoning certain mutually beneficial blackmail exchanges). 
 114.   Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note 112, at 717; Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, 
The Law of Duress, supra note 112, at 391. 
 115.   Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, supra note 112, at 718. 
312 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
anticipate that they will be nullified by courts applying the law of extortion 
or contract duress.  This dooms victims of credible threats to suffer the 
greater harm that they could otherwise have prevented in a protection 
exchange. 
Again, however, this argument rests on untestable empirical 
assumptions.  Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar suggest that under existing law, 
menaces will refuse to offer their victims protection because they 
anticipate that victims of extortion and duress might later avoid their deals 
and recover their ransom payments after the threat is removed.  The 
uncertainty of the law of duress works to the detriment of both parties by 
inhibiting good faith, non-exploitative, warning-offers along with threat-
offers. 
But are parties to a contract actually inhibited by the doctrine of 
duress?  Consider a seller who faces unexpected cost increases and who 
anticipates that without a price increase, it will be forced to breach a supply 
contract.  This seller has an economic incentive to inform the buyer and 
offer to perform at a higher price in an effort to minimize its liability for 
damages if it breaches.  A rational seller will make this credible threat 
despite the risk that the buyer may later renege on the deal and seek 
avoidance under the doctrine of duress.  Such threats seem to be frequently 
made despite the existing rules on duress that make such transactions 
potentially voidable.  It is unlikely that law of contract duress actually 
inhibits a significant amount of renegotiation by parties in such cases.  Nor 
is it likely that any utility lost as a result of such inhibiting effect is greater 
than the utility the duress rule gains by inhibiting bad faith threats or 
bluffs.  Parties whose credible threats should be made and consented to 
should not be deterred by the existing law of duress because they have 
little to lose by the law’s later operation, while those whose threats are not 
credible might be deterred because the expected value of their bluffs is 
reduced. 
The chief argument, however, against the school that would legalize 
blackmail is that it would encourage protection rackets built around legal 
privileges.  It may well be that extortion law creates inefficiency when 
producers are unable to purchase protection from other producers who 
inflict incidental harm as a by-product of productive activity.  But that 
same law also removes the incentive producers may have to maximize the 
harm they are privileged to produce just so they can market protection 
from it. 
More than any other theorist, Daniel Kelly has extensively analyzed 
the potential for protection rackets in the commercialization of threats to 
inflict nuisance harm and the strategic profit from forbearing from 
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harmful, but privileged, activity.116  Kelly focused on nuisance cases, in 
which parties threaten to create costly, otherwise unprofitable nuisances to 
extract extortionate payments from neighboring landowners.  But his 
analysis is not limited to nuisances and extends to exploitation of modern 
environmental legislation.  The profit available from what Kelly calls 
“strategic spillover” effects creates incentives for protection rackets, in 
which menaces develop the ability to inflict nuisances not because the 
harmful activity is directly profitable to them but for strategic reasons, i.e., 
so that they can sell protection in return for forbearance from the harm 
they threaten to cause. 
The unjust enrichment theory of blackmail reaches such threats.  The 
entire payment received by a strategic blackmailer is an extortion premium 
because such a menace incurs no cost in forbearing from the harmful 
behavior.  But the unjust enrichment theory also reaches threats of “non-
strategic” activities that are profitable to the menace but that are 
nevertheless used to extract an extortion premium that exceeds their profit.  
VII.  THE THEORY IN ACTION 
The following examples illustrate how ex post leverage can enable a 
menace to obtain an extortion premium that would have been unavailable 
in an equivalent ex ante protection transaction. 
A. Leverage in the Office: Commercial Secrets Blackmail 
A common form of commercial protection exchange involves the risk 
that an employee will disclose information harmful to an employer, as in 
the following example: 
Emma was employed in a mid-level management position with 
SyynTech, a waste disposal and recycling company.  In the course of her 
employment Emma learned several things about SyynTech’s business 
practices that would cause it legal and public relations problems if made 
public.  Surprisingly, Emma’s contract of employment did not prevent her 
from disclosing this information, and none of it was a legally protectable 
trade secret, all of which left Emma legally free to disclose the damaging 
information to regulatory bodies or others. 
When SyynTech experienced a downturn in its business, it terminated 
Emma’s employment.  Consider three possible scenarios resulting from 
this situation. 
Scenario 1: Worried that termination may lead some of its disaffected 
                                                          
 116.   Kelly, supra note 101, at 1642.  
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ex-employees to become whistle-blowers, SyynTech’s management 
offered each of them a severance package worth $100,000 conditioned 
only on their signing a legally-binding non-disclosure agreement whereby 
the employees agreed never to reveal any information about their jobs at 
SyynTech.  Emma eagerly signed the agreement and received the cash. 
Scenario 1 is a common form of protection exchange.  In the terms 
used in this Article, Emma’s knowledge made her a menace who was a 
risk to SyynTech, the potential victim.  As she was under no legal 
constraint, Emma had a legal privilege,117 vis a vis SyynTech, to disclose 
damaging information to third parties.  In some cases, exercising this 
privilege might be of value to her.  For example, she might be able to sell 
her information about SyynTech’s potential liabilities to a third party 
interested in purchasing SyynTech.  To reduce the risk of disclosure, 
SyynTech offered to pay Emma for her silence.  By accepting this offer, 
Emma promised to keep SyynTech’s secrets, thus replacing her legal 
privilege to disclose with a legally-enforceable duty not to disclose.  In 
this protection transaction, SyynTech purchased a right to confidentiality, 
to which it was not previously entitled, and reduced the expected cost of a 
business risk at a price it was willing to pay.  In return, Emma extinguished 
her privilege to disclose and put herself under a duty of confidentiality in 
return for a price she was willing to accept.  Both parties benefitted by 
changing their legal relationship.  The law smiles on this type of 
transaction and will give it full effect in the courts.118 
Scenario 2: When she got her termination notice, and believing that 
she had been treated unfairly, Emma told SyynTech that, unless she was 
paid $100,000 in cash, she might “go public” with what she knew about 
SyynTech’s “dirty secrets.”  Concerned about the costs of such disclosure, 
SyynTech agreed to pay her, but only in return for a legally-enforceable 
non-disclosure agreement whereby Emma promised never to reveal the 
harmful information.  Emma eagerly signed the agreement and received 
the cash. 
In substance the second transaction is identical to the first.  As before, 
SyynTech sought to reduce its business risk incident to disclosure and to 
put Emma under a new legal obligation of confidentiality.  As before, 
Emma sought to be compensated for giving up her legal privilege of 
disclosure and placing herself under a new legal duty. 
                                                          
 117.   A party such as Emma has a legal privilege to do an act if she is under no duty to SynTec to 
refrain from the act and SynTec would have no claim against her if she acted.  See Sidney W. DeLong, 
What is a Contract?, 67 S.C. L. REV. 99 (2015). 
 118.   It is assumed that no public policy was offended by the agreement.  See Garfield, supra note 
72, at 261. 
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Yet the law that smiles on the first transaction frowns on the second 
one.  The transaction in Scenario 1 was induced by an offer from 
SyynTech; Scenario 2 was induced by a threat from Emma.  Emma made 
her threat in order to receive the consideration paid by SyynTech.  Under 
Scenario 2, Emma may have committed extortion.119  As a matter of civil 
law, SyynTech’s promise to pay her is unenforceable under the doctrine 
of duress120 and, if it has already paid her, SyynTech can recover the 
payment in restitution.121 
Ethical judgment also sharply distinguishes between Emma’s 
behavior in the two transactions.  Emma has done nothing “wrong” in 
Scenario 1; indeed, she is not even thought of as the actor.  She has 
helpfully acceded to SyynTech’s request by accepting its offer and its 
money in return for submitting herself to a new duty of confidentiality.  
Although she may have valued her ability to disclose what she knows to 
third parties, she bound herself to secrecy. 
But conventional ethical judgment condemns Emma’s conduct in 
Scenario 2.  As the threatener, she, not SyynTech, is the active agent while 
SyynTech is her victim.  She has the morals of a blackmailer122 and has 
abused her privilege123 of free speech.124  Her motives are malicious and 
SyynTech is the victim who deserves our sympathy. 
Now consider a third possibility: 
Scenario 3: As part of its normal employment agreement, SyynTech 
required all its employees to agree at the time they were hired that they 
would not disclose any information about its business for a period of five 
years following termination of their employment for any reason.  Emma 
willing and knowingly agreed to this term when she was hired and did not 
demand extra compensation for the restriction.  When Emma was 
terminated, SyynTech did not pay her any severance pay, although it 
reminded her of her duty of confidentiality. 
The parties’ legal relationship under Scenario 3 is in most respects 
identical to their relationship following Scenarios 1 and 2: In all three 
scenarios, Emma voluntarily placed herself under a legal obligation not to 
disclose SyynTech’s secrets in return for which SyynTech paid her 
consideration.  The crucial legal and economic difference between 
                                                          
 119.   See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 120.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 176 (defining wrongful threats for 
purposes of duress). 
 121.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 14(2) (“A transfer induced by duress is subject 
to rescission and restitution.”).  
 122.   See infra Part III. 
 123.   Actually, she has abused only her privilege of speech, properly defined.  See infra Part III. 
 124.   See infra Part III. 
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Scenario 3 and the first two Scenarios arises solely from Emma’s greater 
leverage in the first two scenarios.  In scenario 3, Emma sold 
confidentiality in an ex ante transaction before she acquired the practical 
ability to harm SyynTech, i.e., before she learned its secrets.  The cost of 
her undertaking reflected her minimal opportunity cost in binding herself 
to secrecy rather than the expected value of the harm that disclosure would 
cost SyynTech.  Emma negotiated as a monopolist in the first two 
scenarios and in a competitive market in the third.  It is not surprising that 
the transaction depicted in Scenario 3 is neither legally nor morally 
problematic, having no overtones of extortion or exploitation. 
Emma obtained an extortion premium in Scenarios 1 and 2 because 
the price SyynTech paid for her forbearance greatly exceeded Emma’s 
costs in forbearing.  To the extent that she was aware that SyynTech was 
paying her out of fear of what she might do, Emma was unjustly enriched 
in both cases under the analysis offered here.  
B. Leverage in the Neighborhood: Spite Structure Blackmail 
Owners of real property may, under local law, be privileged to conduct 
activities or to build structures on the land in ways that impose costs on 
their neighbors in the form of eyesores, air or noise pollution, view 
blockage, water runoff, and the like.  To the extent that the neighbors 
cannot avoid or mitigate these harms by technology or by moving away, 
the nuisance value of the threatened land use is a potential source of 
leverage in a protection exchange.  The owner of the eyesore might agree 
to remove it at a price the neighbor is willing to pay which can approach 
the subjective cost that the neighbor experiences from the nuisance.  
Threats are rarely necessary in such situations because the neighbor is 
likely to make the offer when the nuisance becomes apparent. 
Because of the risk of such leverage, ex ante real estate protection 
transactions are commonplace.  A landowner may purchase a view 
easement from the owner of a neighboring parcel.  The agreement will 
bind future owners of both parcels of land, eliminating the threat of a 
structure that would block the view of the victim’s property.  A landowner 
might purchase a restrictive covenant limiting other land uses that a 
neighbor may engage in to avoid the risk of a later extortionate transaction.  
The Problem of Social Cost illustrated several actual and potential 
transactions between neighbors resolving the problems of such harm.125  
In some cases, if a protection transaction is not feasible, a landowner may 
simply purchase the adjoining lot, perhaps reselling it to a third party 
                                                          
 125.   See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2. 
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subject to a restrictive covenant protecting both properties. 
As always, the price a potential menace will demand for such 
protection will depend in part on whether it has leverage over the victim, 
which will turn on whether the transaction is ex ante or ex post in relation 
to the victim’s vulnerability to the threatened harm.  Typical ex ante real 
estate protection exchanges are the covenants and conditions agreed to by 
new homebuyers in a residential development.  Each buyer agrees to 
forbear from identified land uses that would harm the value of neighboring 
lots.  The “price” demanded for this protection is the reciprocal promise 
of all homebuyers and is unrelated to the value of the restriction to each 
buyer.  The mutual abandonment of the legal privilege to engage in the 
full range of legally-permissible land uses is economically efficient under 
the standard of social cost, as measured by the net utility to each new 
homeowner created by the tradeoff between liberty and protection. 
After a party has purchased property, its vulnerability to a neighbor’s 
harmful land use creates leverage that can greatly increase the price it must 
pay for protection.  Leverage is particularly common in relationships 
between neighboring residential homeowners in locations in which the 
public or private land use regulation does not prohibit building structures 
that harm the value of neighboring property.   
The problem of extortion by spite structures has been extensively 
analyzed.126  Larissa Katz has argued that an owner abuses its rights of 
ownership when it leverages its ability to harm another through an exercise 
of its rights to use its property.127  Daniel Kelly has analyzed several 
instances of what he refers to as “strategic spillovers” in which land 
owners acquire the ability to harm other people simply to sell protection 
from the harm they can cause.128  Many of these involved parties who 
threaten neighboring homeowners with nuisances or spite structures.129  
                                                          
 126.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS, §176, illus. 10 (For purposes of duress, a threat 
to use property in such a way would be “wrongful.”); NOZICK, supra note 77, at 84–85 (A neighbor’s 
purchase of abstention from one who otherwise plans to erect a “monstrosity” is a productive exchange 
but not if the neighbor threatens to erect it just to extort a payment.); Campbell, supra note 77, at 388 
n.13 (similarly).  The example assumes that the neighbor’s threatened action was legally privileged, 
so that the landowner could not enjoin the structure as a nuisance or under the rules relating to “spite” 
structures. 
 127.   Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 
122 YALE L.J. 1444 (2013).  Property rights are abused when they are employed other than for their 
purpose, which she identifies as solving the coordination problems that attend collective use of goods.  
The author especially criticizes owners using property rights as “leverage” to obtain some other benefit 
from the victim.  On the general recognition of abuse of rights in American law, see Joseph M. Perillo, 
Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37 (1995). 
 128.   Kelly, supra note 101, at 1642. 
 129.   Id. at 1661. 
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The entire payment constitutes an extortion premium in such cases 
because the cost of the menace’s forbearance is zero, or even negative. 
Some of these points are illustrated in the following example: 
Scenario 1: Mark is a wealthy businessperson who purchased a lot and 
built a mansion on it.  Mark’s master bedroom is on the top floor.  Vinnie 
then purchased an adjacent lot and told Mark that he planned to build a 
house near the lot line with a top floor window that would give Vinnie a 
direct view into Mark’s bedroom.  Vinnie’s plans would not violate any 
land use regulation or contractual obligation.  But before building his 
house, Vinnie graciously offered to sell Mark his lot at a significant 
markup to permit Mark to preserve his privacy.  Mark bought the lot from 
Vinnie.130 
Vinnie had leverage over Mark because Mark had already sunk costs 
into building his home and his alternatives (suffering the invasion of 
privacy, replacing his bedroom windows with a wall, moving away) were 
all more costly than buying Vinnie out.  On the reasonable assumption that 
this payment greatly exceeded the cost to Vinnie of forbearing from 
engaging in the harmful act, e.g., by building his house away from the lot 
line, Vinnie obtained an extortion premium by exercising leverage.  Vinnie 
has committed blackmail under the standard of this Article and has been 
unjustly enriched by the amount by which Mark’s payment exceeded the 
value of his lot. 
Scenario 2: After the transaction with Vinnie, Mark feared that Kim, 
his neighbor on the other side might pose a similar threat.  To forestall this 
risk, Mark asked Kim for a restrictive covenant that would bar both parties 
from building structures that would violate each other’s privacy.  The 
covenants would “run with the land” and bind future owners of both lots.  
Although Kim would ordinarily have agreed to such an arrangement, 
before she signed, she learned from Vinnie how much money Mark paid 
him for his lot.  Kim decided that her agreement was as valuable to Mark 
as Vinnie’s threat was.  Without uttering a threat, Kim simply refused 
Mark’s request unless he paid an amount equal to the excessive amount he 
paid Vinnie.  Because it was the only way to secure his privacy, Mark paid 
Kim’s demand, and she signed the agreement. 
Kim also exercised leverage over Mark and profited to the same 
degree as Vinnie.  But because she made no threat, Kim would not have 
committed extortion.  She did nothing to justify Mark’s fears of her except 
to refuse his offer until he met her price.   
                                                          
 130.   The hypothetical is based on news reports of a transaction between Mark Zuckerberg and 
Mircea Voskerician.  After buying the lot from Voskerician, Zuckerberg then reportedly purchased 
three other surrounding properties, apparently to forestall future threats.  Evans, supra note 77. 
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Kim might argue that she should not be subject to moral opprobrium 
either.  After all, Mark was the one who asked her to sell and a property 
owner is entitled to ask for any price she wishes.  Just because Mark is a 
billionaire does not give him the right to exercise eminent domain or 
private condemnation of Kim’s property to satisfy his own desire for 
privacy. 
However, Kim is culpable under the theory of blackmail suggested 
here because she has exploited her leverage over Mark to extract an 
extortion premium that left her unjustly enriched. 
Scenario 3: Mark, Vinnie, and Kim simultaneously purchased their 
lots from Plutocrat Mansions, a land developer that required each buyer to 
sign restrictive covenants limiting construction on their lots in various 
ways.  Although they limit the use that can be made of the lots, the 
covenants make the lots more valuable for residential purposes because of 
the mutual protection the lot owners have against each other.  If Vinnie 
then threatened to build a non-conforming house that would violate these 
covenants, Mark could sue to enjoin the building. 
Under the analysis here proposed, the nuisance owner who charges 
only its cost of complying with the neighbor’s wishes is not engaging in 
blackmail but in a benign Coasean bribe.  The owner did not obtain a 
blackmail premium and did not intentionally profit from the harm he was 
causing the neighbor.  Conversely, an owner who builds a spite structure 
for the purpose of selling abatement to the neighbor and who charges an 
amount calculated by the harm the structure causes the neighbor is 
engaging in blackmail as here defined.  But between these extremes is an 
enormous gray area in moral theory about trafficking in harm. 
For example, assume that the offending use consists of several large 
trees on an unimproved lot that obstruct a very valuable ocean view from 
an adjacent lot on which an expensive home is being constructed.  If the 
owner merely refuses an offer of money by the developer to remove the 
trees, no one would see this as blackmail.  But what if the offer to pay for 
tree removal reaches or even exceeds the market value of the unimproved 
lot?  If the owner of the unimproved lot is eventually paid such a sum, has 
he been unjustly enriched?131  What if the owner is instead operating a 
marginal business that detracts from the residential surroundings?  Or what 
if he is the lone hold-out in a multi-million-dollar real estate development 
that depends critically on his lot?  Conventional morality is ambivalent 
about these situations.  
                                                          
 131.   See Christopher, supra note 82, at 1135 (discussing the blackmail “counter-offer” to a bribe 
offer by the victim) (citing Murray N. Rothbard, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982)). 
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C. Leverage in the Campaign: Reputational Blackmail 
In some industries, the infliction and prevention of harmful 
interactions can has become business as usual.  The distinction between 
blackmail and bribery is exceedingly thin in a field of practice in which 
parties expend significant resources in the concealment, discovery, and 
disclosure of each other’s harmful secrets.  Witness the modern, political 
campaign: 
Mogul and Pol are locked in a tight race for the Presidency.  Gordon 
is a wealthy supporter of Pol and seeks campaign material adverse to 
Mogul.  Gordon offers a reward of $1 million for credible evidence that 
Mogul has engaged in money laundering in his business ventures.  
Sherlock is a firm that specializes in forensic and political opposition 
research.  In response to the reward offer, after costly research, one of 
Sherlock’s employees, Bartleby, finds and secures the sought-for 
evidence.  Consider three scenarios: 
Scenario 1:  Dissatisfied with the amount of the reward that Gordon 
has offered, Sherlock secretly approaches Mogul and threatens to disclose 
the evidence to Gordon unless Mogul pays it $1.5 million.  Mogul, fearing 
loss of the election if the evidence is disclosed, eagerly accepts the offer 
and pays, receiving in return the destruction of the evidence and 
Sherlock’s agreement never to disclose it.  But after Mogul wins the 
election, and no longer fearing disclosure, he orders the Attorney General 
to prosecute Sherlock for extortion.  Because Sherlock obtained money by 
threats to disclose Mogul’s secret, it might well have incurred criminal 
liability for the transaction. 
Scenario 2:  Bartleby, the Sherlock employee who found the evidence, 
is a life-long friend and loyal supporter of Mogul.  Without Sherlock’s 
knowledge, Bartleby warns Mogul of his peril, but suggests that he could 
buy the evidence from Sherlock if he offered more than Gordon offered.  
Bartleby suggests that Mogul offer Sherlock $1.5 million.  Mogul thanks 
Bartleby for the tip and, after negotiation over the price, makes the 
suggested offer to Sherlock.  Sherlock eagerly accepts and sells secrecy to 
Mogul for $1.5 million.  Because Mogul was not threatened and he 
initiated the transaction himself, this transaction is not extortion and 
should be fully enforceable on each side.   
Scenario 3:  Having obtained the evidence and wishing to appear fair 
to all concerned, Sherlock privately informs both Gordon and Mogul that 
it has the evidence sought by Gordon and will sell it to the highest bidder.  
After an auction, Mogul makes the highest bid of $1.5 million and 
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Sherlock sells him the evidence.132  Mogul is grateful for the opportunity 
to buy and bury the evidence and asks for a right of first-refusal to buy any 
other embarrassing information Sherlock may acquire about him in the 
future. 
These scenarios illustrate the thin line between bribery and blackmail.  
In all three examples, Sherlock was a menace, Mogul was a victim, and 
the two engaged in a protection transaction.  Mogul made the payment in 
each case only because Sherlock made it known that otherwise it would 
disclose the secret to Gordon, harming Mogul’s election prospects.  The 
first transaction was initiated by Sherlock’s threat, the second one by 
Bartleby’s warning and Mogul’s offer, and the third one by Sherlock’s 
warning and offer to sell followed by Mogul’s auction offer.  In none of 
the examples was the threat a bluff: Sherlock would have benefited by $1 
million if it carried out the threat and earned the reward from Gordon.   
In the first two transactions Sherlock appears to have obtained an 
extortion premium of $500,000, although it is uncertain what Gordon 
might have paid for the information if offered the chance.  In the third 
transaction, the auction, Sherlock appears not to have obtained an 
extortion premium over the cost of its forbearance (the losing bid by 
Mogul).133  In each case, the true cost of Sherlock’s forbearance to exercise 
the threat of disclosure to Gordon depends on how much Gordon would 
have bid for the evidence if given the opportunity. 
D. Leverage in the Courtroom: Remedial Blackmail 
A person who suffers harm can become a blackmailer herself if the 
law gives her a remedy that she can use against the wrongdoer.  A party 
with a remedial right has leverage to obtain an extortion premium 
whenever the defendant’s cost of complying with the remedy exceeds the 
value of the remedy to the plaintiff.134  Thus, for example, a homeowner 
group that is entitled to enjoin a factory from smoke can demand for the 
release of the injunction more than the amount of damage than the smoke 
would have caused.  A business that is entitled to enjoin an ex-employee 
                                                          
 132.   In his analysis of secrets blackmail, Coase assumed that the victim would always value 
secrecy more than the menace would value disclosure as grounds that the state should assign the right 
to secrecy to the victim.  Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 673.  
 133.   Lindgren, On Waste, supra note 83, at 597 contains an eerily prescient hypothetical case of 
a fashion model who has an affair with a presidential candidate and accepts a million dollars for her 
silence.  Id. at 603.  Lindgren uses the example to counter economic arguments that blackmail is illegal 
because of wasted transaction costs, but he does not address his third-party leverage argument.  Id. 
 134.   Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 670 (stating the payment does not represent what the 
menace would lose by forbearing from the threatened action). 
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from competition can demand for its release of the injunction more than 
the cost that it would suffer from this competition.  
The risk of extortion by a plaintiff who wields an injunction has long 
been recognized.135  An injunction is an order by a court directing the 
defendant to do or refrain from doing something.136  Failure to comply 
constitutes civil contempt, which subjects the defendant to fine or 
imprisonment until it complies.137  An injunction is awarded when the 
court finds that an award of damages would be inadequate to restore 
plaintiff to its rightful position.138 
In theory, an injunction should not be awarded if the court finds that 
the balance of hardships favors issuance, meaning that the plaintiff will 
suffer more from the enjoined act than the defendant will suffer by 
compliance with the injunction.139  In some cases, the cost of compliance 
with the injunction may dwarf any possible damage that the plaintiff would 
suffer from the enjoined act.  For example, a party that has recklessly 
constructed an unauthorized structure on the property of another may be 
enjoined to remove it.140  Compliance with an injunction may be costly, 
and, while courts should balance the hardships of the parties in deciding 
whether to issue an injunction, it is quite possible that a party will be 
ordered to do something that imposes a cost that is disproportion to the 
harm faced by the plaintiff if it fails to comply.  The plaintiff, however, 
has the legal power to release the defendant from the obligation to comply 
with an injunction if the defendant buys its consent.  The plaintiff will 
surely demand for this release an amount that will compensate it for the 
                                                          
 135.   A. Michael Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive 
and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1980) (noting that the possibility of extortion 
exists when enforcement of the injunction would impose costs on the defendant that exceed the 
damage that plaintiff would suffer if the enjoined activity occurs).  Richard Epstein observed that 
injunctions raise the hold-out problem, which is the reciprocal of the externality problem.  Richard A. 
Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. 
LEGAL STUD. & ECON. 553, 559 (1993).   
 136.   I DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1(2) (2d Ed. 1993) (Injunction is a coercive remedy enforced 
by threat of contempt.). 
 137.   Coercive contempt may consist of a fine or imprisonment until the defendant obeys the 
order.  Willful disobedience of an injunction may be punished as a crime.  Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828–29 (1994).  
 138.   DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 22–23 (discussing the 
relation of irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law) (1991). 
 139.   I DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(5). 
 140.   Whitlock v. Hilander Foods, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 307, 308–09 (Ill. App. 1999) (order reversing 
summary judgment and remanding to rehear the issue of removal of encroaching concrete footings at 
base of retaining wall despite cost); see M.T. Van Hecke, Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures 
Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 TEX. L. REV. 521 (1954) (finding courts more inclined 
to enjoin deliberate violations than inadvertent ones). 
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harm that the enjoined act is likely to inflict.  But it may demand more.141 
An injunction thus gives a plaintiff leverage whenever the defendant’s 
cost of compliance exceeds the cost to the plaintiff of releasing the 
injunction.142  Courts alert to this risk may refuse injunctions in order not 
to give blackmail leverage to the plaintiff.143  In Carbon County Coal Co. 
v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,144 a utility repudiated a 
requirements contract with a coal company.  Although the company was 
awarded its lost net income as damages for breach of the contract, it also 
sought an order of specific performance that would have required the 
utility to purchase the balance of the coal for the remaining term of the 
contract at the contract rate.145  Affirming the trial court’s refusal to grant 
the injunction, Judge Posner reasoned that the coal company would never 
actually enforce the order even if it was issued, but was instead seeking 
judicial leverage to demand that the utility pay a much greater sum than 
the actual damages for its release.146 
A court sought to mitigate a plaintiff’s injunction leverage in a 
situation in which the parties were in a bilateral locational monopoly 
relationship in the widely-analyzed decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Co.147  A cement plant that was built at a cost of $45 million and that 
employed over 300 workers was found to have constituted a nuisance to 
nearby residents because of pollution generated by its operation.148  The 
court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against the plant’s 
pollution activities as a nuisance,149 but permitted the defendant to buy a 
release of the injunction by paying a total of $185,000 in damages to the 
residents, which represented the harm to their property caused by the 
nuisance.150  This option had the effect of limiting the plaintiffs’ leverage 
                                                          
 141.   Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land 
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 720–21 (1973) (noting that a court will be reluctant to enjoin a 
nuisance if the injunction imposes costs on the defendant that are greater than the costs of the nuisance 
to the plaintiff). 
 142.   As Professor Laycock put it, “[g]ranting or withholding the injunction allocates the power 
to be unreasonable between bilateral monopolists.”  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES 329 (Concise 4th ed. 2012).  
 143.   See Ellickson, supra note 141, at 731–32 (arguing that nuisance cases often lead to 
inefficient injunctions in which the costs to the defendant exceed the benefit to the plaintiff). 
 144.   799 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 145.   Id. at 268. 
 146.   Id. at 279 (“Probably . . . Carbon County is seeking specific performance in order to have 
bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think of no reason why the law should give it such 
leverage.”). 
 147.   257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
 148.   Id. at 223. 
 149.   Id. at 872.  Its alternative was to find it liable for damages in trespass.  Id.  
 150.   Id. at 873.  In effect, this permitted the plant to purchase a pollution easement for the amount 
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to the actual cost they suffered from the illegal land use.  If instead the 
court had given the residents an unconditional injunction, they could have 
demanded an extortion premium of up to $45 million as the price of their 
release of the injunction order.151 
The courts in Northern Indiana and Boomer refused or limited 
injunctions to limit blackmail leverage.  But after a court has issued an 
injunction, the plaintiff is ideally situated to extort a premium for the 
release without having to utter a threat, and without fear of liability for 
criminal extortion.  It may simply refuse to release the injunction in return 
for a reasonable payment by the defendant. 
Blackmail leverage can be wielded in injunction cases whenever the 
cost of complying with the injunction exceeds the value of the injunction 
to the plaintiff.152  And under the analysis in this Article, it is extortionate 
for the plaintiff to refuse to release an injunction unless paid an amount 
that greatly exceeds any harm to the plaintiff that the enjoined act would 
cause. 
Although a damages judgment is not as coercive as an injunction, the 
leverage essential to blackmail can also arise in contracts cases whenever 
a party’s cost of performance exceeds the value of that performance to its 
counter-party.  This is because the plaintiff is entitled to recover as 
damages the cost of “cover,” obtaining performance from a third party.  
Plaintiff has leverage to the extent that the cost of performance exceeds 
the value of the performance to the plaintiff.  A reliable sign of this 
situation is that the plaintiff would not actually use the damages award to 
replace the breaching party’s performance. 
A dramatic example occurred in Groves v. John Wunder153 where the 
lessee of a gravel pit failed to remediate the property at the end of the lease 
                                                          
of damages.  Joel C. Dobris, Boomer Twenty Years Later: An Introduction with Some Footnotes about 
Theory, 54 ALB. L. REV. 171, 174 (1990) (suggesting that the parties always anticipated that the 
defendant would buy off the injunction). 
 151.   On the economic implications of the case, see Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law 
of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1990). 
 152.   In practice, post-award renegotiation of injunctions appears to be rare.  Ward Farnsworth, 
Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 373 (1999) (speculating on reasons that parties rarely buy releases from injunctions).  
 153.   Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235, 241 (Minn. 1939) (holding owner’s damages 
for the contractor’s repudiation of its duty to remediate the property should be measured by the 
$60,000 cost of performance rather than the $12,000 diminution in value of plaintiff’s property).  
Contra Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 111–12 (Okla. 1962) (criticizing 
Groves and awarding only diminution of value damages instead of cost to remediate family farm at 
end of mineral lease).  One court held that cost of completion in excess of diminution in value should 
be awarded only if the court determines that the plaintiff will in fact complete performance.  Advanced, 
Inc. v. Wilks, 711 P.2d 524, 527 (Alaska 1985).  In such a case, the plaintiff’s demand for the cost of 
completion would not be extortionate as defined in this Article. 
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term as required by the contract.  The lessor sought damages for breach of 
the remediation obligation as measured by the cost of completing the 
contract rather than by the diminution in value of the property caused by 
the breach.  The evidence showed that it would have cost the defendant 
$60,000 to perform the remediation, while the total value of the 
commercial property after remediation would have been only $12,000.154  
The court approved of an award based on the cost to complete the 
remediation rather than on the diminution in value of the property.155  This 
represented a nice profit for the plaintiff who had no commercial reason 
to expend the award on remediating the property.156  
It may be argued that a contractor who has such a duty should not 
breach the contract but should negotiate with the plaintiff for a release of 
the executory duty of performance by offering the plaintiff the full 
equivalent of performance.  In Groves, the lessee could have offered the 
lessor $12,000 for a release of the obligation to remediate the property.  If 
indeed that sum represented the full value of performance to the lessor, it 
might be argued that it should have acceded to this request.  But what if it 
demanded and received $50,000 for the release?  Under the analysis of this 
Article, the $38,000 would have been an extortion premium, an example 
of remedial blackmail.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Ironically, the primary transaction cost that prevents Coasean 
bargaining over harm-related legal entitlements is one that he failed to 
identify in The Problem of Social Costs: many of the bargains he proposed 
would be prohibited by law.  In light of the presumptive utility of Coasean 
bargains in harm-related entitlements, legal theory must justify its 
prohibition of protection transactions in which victims purchase protection 
from harm that menaces are legally privileged to inflict.  No such 
justification has been found.  The law’s prohibition of some protection 
transactions rests not on what is exchanged but upon whether they were 
initiated by a menace’s threat or a victim’s offer. 
                                                          
 154.   Groves, 286 N.W. at 241. 
 155.   Id. at 238–39.  The court remanded the case for a determination whether the lease actually 
required remediation of the sort demanded.  The award in Groves appears to be in conflict with the 
rule stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS.  It permits an award of either the diminution 
in the market price of the property caused by the breach (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 348 
(2)(a)) or the reasonable cost of completing performance (Id. at § 348 (2)(b)), but only if the cost of 
completion is “not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him.” Id.   
 156.   Professor Dawson reports that the Groves parties settled for a payment of $55,000.  The 
plaintiff did not use the money to remediate the property.  DAWSON, HARVEY, AND HENDERSON, 
CONTRACTS 19 (8th ed. 2003). 
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This Article has suggested that the difference between bribery and 
blackmail should lie not in the presence or absence of a threat but in the 
price the menace demands for protection from the harm it can inflict on 
the victim.  Regardless of which party initiates them, Coasean bargains are 
not problematic so long as menaces sell forbearance at or near their cost, 
as did the enterprises discussed in The Problem of Social Cost.  Coasean 
bargains become extortionate only when, by exercising leverage, the 
menace extracts an extortion premium that exceeds that cost.  A menace’s 
profit from the harm it is legally privileged to inflict enriches it unjustly 
and transforms protection markets into protection rackets. 
But the unjust enrichment standard, while theoretically and morally 
defensible, is unworkable in practice in many cases.  When courts lack 
information about a menace’s true costs of forbearance, the extortion 
premium may be an unworkable measure of legality.  In the absence of 
any better test, the threat requirement may at least inhibit deliberate 
attempts at extortion while permitting victim-initiated bribes.  Over- and 
under-inclusiveness may be the best the law can achieve. 
Like the concept of extortion, the concept of unjust enrichment is 
invisible to economic analysis because it rests on a moral judgment rather 
than a calculation of social cost.  Coase realized this, perhaps better than 
some of his critics.  Near the end of The Problem of Social Cost, Coase 
quoted fellow economist Frank Knight: “[P]roblems of welfare economics 
must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals.”157  The 
ethical quandaries posed by trafficking in harm cannot be resolved by 
appeals to efficiency alone. 
 
                                                          
 157.   Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 2, at 43.  Concerning the difficulty of 
establishing clear legal definitions of blackmail, he also confessed that “It would be a sad day if all 
the answers had to be given by economists.” Coase, Blackmail, supra note 6, at 676.  
